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Abstract
The Constitution’s protection of racial and religious groups is organized
around the concept of discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court, however,
has never provided a crisp, single definition of ‘discriminatory intent’
applicable across institutions and among policy contexts. Instead, current
jurisprudence tacks among several competing conceptions. Amplifying
doctrinal complexity, the Court has taken conflicting approaches to the
practical, and consequential, question of how to go about substantiating
impermissible motives with admissible evidence. Although the Court’s
pluralistic conception of intent is plausible and perhaps even unavoidable,
its lack of any principled approached to the practical question of how to
sift and weigh evidence of unconstitutional motive is not defensible.
Instead, the current doctrinal apparatus for the discovery of
discriminatory intent has hidden regressive effects as between different
plaintiffs and between different defendants. It further influences the
available flow of information about discrimination in ways that compound
and entrench those distributive effects. I suggest a revised doctrinal
framework that acknowledges conceptual pluralism in the constitutional
law of antidiscrimination, but that reorients the evidentiary framework for
demonstrating discrimination intent to mitigate the presently distorted
allocation of judicial resources.

* Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. My thanks to
Deborah Hellman, Naomi Schoenbaum, Nicholas Stephanopoulos, and Andrew Verstein, for terrific and
extremely helpful comments. All errors are mine.
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Judging Discriminatory Intent
Introduction
“Discriminatory intent” is a central term in the judicial interpretation of
constitutional clauses requiring the equal treatment of persons notwithstanding race,
ethnicity, or religion.1 The centrality of intent is not apparent from the text of the First
Amendment’s Religion Clauses or the Fourteen Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.2
Indeed, it is possible to imagine a jurisprudence of constitutional immunity for natural
persons from invidious discrimination that does not hinge upon the subjective,
psychological state of the defendant state actor.3
The central role of intent in the doctrinal articulation of individual rights against
unconstitutional discrimination is a surprisingly recent doctrinal phenomenon. As late as
1971, the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Thompson could claim to find “no case in this
Court [holding] that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the
motivations of the men who voted for it.”4 The Palmer Court’s declaration, to be sure, is
carefully calibrated. It carefully skirted prior judicial accountings of legislative intent in
early twentieth century federalism5 and Establishment Clause6 domains, while putting to
one side prior judicial challenges to the racially discriminatory actions of specific
1

See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1479 (2017) (discussing how an intent standard is met);
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1831 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (concurring in the
rejection of a challenge to petitioner municipality’s use of prayer at the beginning of official meetings, by
noting that the mistake was at worst careless, and not done with a discriminatory intent, i.e., if “the
omission of these synagogues were intentional”); accord Paul Gowder, Racial Classification and Ascriptive
Injury, 92 WASH. U.L. REV. 325, 333–34 (2014) (“Plaintiffs must show either by direct evidence or by
inference that the state intended to bring about segregation--a state policy that merely causes segregation,
without such intent, is not subject to challenge”).
2
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“ …. [N]or shall any State … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws); amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ….”) .
3
For a leading example of such a theory, see Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL
& PUB. AFF. 107 (1976); see also David Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-55
(1978) (criticizing the role of “fault” and “causation” in antidiscrimination law for precluding relevant
inquiries).
4
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971). For a similar statement in the First Amendment Free
Speech domain, see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“The decisions of this Court from
the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of
lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.”
(citation omitted)).
5
See, e.g., Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922) (taking the “intent” of Congress to be
pivotal when invalidating a tax on the products of child labor).
6
See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1961) (holding that a state law violates the
Establishment Clause if “its purpose—evidenced either on the face of the legislation, in conjunction with
its legislative history, or in its operative effect—is to use the State's coercive power to aid religion”); Board
of Ed. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (looking at the “purpose” of a measure to
ascertain compliance with the Establishment Clause).
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officials.7 Nevertheless, it captures a surprising, and now largely forgotten, skepticism
about the role of intent when interpreting the Constitution’s protections for vulnerable
minority groups.
Nevertheless, the Palmer Court’s suspicions have proved evanescent. In the same
Term it was abjuring intent in Palmer, the Court doubled down on the role of improper,
non-secular purpose in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.8 The Justices subsequently
underscored in categorical terms that officials must not act on the basis of a preference
for one religious denomination.9 Two years after Palmer, Equal Protection jurisprudence
began to change course when the Court in a critical school desegregation case cautioned
against any impermissible “[p]urpose or Intent to segregate.”10 And three years after that,
in the landmark decision of Washington v. Davis, it held that a “discriminatory racial
purpose” was “necessary” to state an Equal Protection violation.11 The last piece of the
doctrinal mosaic to fall into place concerned the Free Exercise Clause. Long focused on
the disparate effect of neutral laws on religious believers,12 it pivoted sharply in early
1990s to a standard in which discriminatory intent played a central role.13 As a result,
intent now plays a central role whenever an individual litigant invokes the Constitution’s
protection against official discrimination because of race, ethnicity, or faith.
But what does it mean to say that an official action is motivated by a
‘discriminatory intent’? And how can litigants prove up an allegation of improper
motivation? The federal judiciary has not homed in upon a single definition of
discriminatory intent, or a consistent approach to the evidentiary tools through which it is
substantiated. Instead, studied ambiguity in doctrinal formulations means that judges
have acquired a large measure of discretion in resolving constitutional discrimination
cases. Their leeway flows from an implicit ability to tack between different conceptions
of discrimination, and further between various mechanisms by which its allegation can be
substantiated. The aim of this Article is to offer a cartography of discriminatory intent’s
7

Cases that are difficult to explain without accounting for intent include Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339, 341 (1960) (invalidating oddly shared boundary drawn around the city of Tuskegee as motivated by
race); Hunter v. Erikson, 383 U.S. 386, 391 (1969) (invalidating housing ordinance that placed a “special
burden” on racial minorities). Indeed, some of the first Equal Protection cases concerned discriminatory
enforcement of the laws. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating conviction of a
Chinese national prosecuted in a pattern of discriminatory enforcement of a San Francisco ordinance
concerning laundries).
8
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (imposing a “secular purpose” requirement). In fact, the
use of intent and purpose in Establishment Clause jurisprudence goes back at least to the direction in
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), that the state may not “prefer one religion over
another.”
9
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 254 (1982) (condemning a state rule because of its “express design—to
burden or favor selected religious denominations”)
10
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205 (1973).
11
426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
12
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
13
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (holding that “if
the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is
not neutral”); see also Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882
(1990) (upholding criminalization of penalties on ceremonial use of peyote, but flagging that there was “no
contention that Oregon's drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs”).
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competing strands, and to offer a critique of the way in which those threads are presently
woven together.
The idea that simple doctrinal terms can mask deep disagreement is hardly novel.
While few should be surprised that ‘discrimination’ has been productive of dissonance,
an illustrative range of its divergent judicial uses from the summer of 2017 is helpful to
motivate the analysis.14 Three are from the Supreme Court. One is from a state trial court,
but usefully illustrates a legal question about discrimination that the Justices rarely
entertain.
•

In March 2017, the Supreme Court rejected a long-standing prohibition on post-trial
inquiry into juror behavior to hold that a Colorado trial court should have allowed
testimonial evidence that a juror relied on “racial stereotypes or animus to convict a
criminal defendant.”15 The dissenting Justices agreed that such discriminatory intent
was pernicious and unconstitutional, but argued that the stability of the common-law
rule against impeaching jurors outweighed the costs of verdicts tainted by such
intent.16 Had the dissenters prevailed, cases where a biased juror does not reveal her
bias until the eve of verdict would have lacked any airing of discriminatory intent’s
role.

•

In a second decision, mere weeks later, the Court invoked statistical evidence, public
statements, and the trial testimony of state legislators to hold that the use of race as a
proxy for partisan affiliation in North Carolina’s legislative redistricting violated the
Equal Protection Clause.17 No Justice blinked at the use of trial testimony this time.
Nor did they abjure statistical evidence (even though it had previously been
repudiated in the criminal context).18 But unlike the jury bias case, however, the
Court did not suggest that a litigant needed to point to the presence of stereotypes or
other negative views in order to trigger constitutional scrutiny.

•

To see the absence of judicial inquiry into discriminatory intent, it is necessary to
look beyond the Supreme Court. A few months after the North Carolina judgment, a
Minnesota jury issued a verdict of acquittal in the nationally watched manslaughter
trial of police officer Jeronimo Yanez related to his shooting of African-American
motorist Philandro Castillo.19 Although race loomed large in public debate about the
incident—one of many high-profile police shootings of Africa-Americans—the

14

My analysis focuses on constitutional, rather than statutory antidiscrimination, jurisprudence. Different
frameworks of burden-shifting have developed, and the kinds of evidentiary issues addressed in Part III that
arise in considering government action do not arise.
15
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
16
Id. at 875 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court is surely correct that even a tincture of racial bias can
inflict great damage on that system ….”).
17
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1475 (2017).
18
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93 (1987) (rejecting the use of statistical evidence to allege
racial bias in the administration of capital sentences).
19
Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile. N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-shooting-trial-philando-castile.html.
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prosecution’s case rested on evidence from an expert in police force,20 and featured
neither testimonial nor empirical inquiry into Officer Yanez’s potential biases. For
instance, jurors heard nothing about experimental psychology data that points towards
a persistent but unconscious racial differential in police willingness to shoot.21 As a
result, the trial process marginalized the potential role of race in police violence
cases.
•

Ten days later, the Court took up another legal dispute about the role of
constitutionally sensitive classification. That case concerned an executive order
issued by President Trump imposing limitations on travel to the U.S. by nationals of
six Muslim majority nations.22 Because the so-called ‘travel ban’ had been challenged
on Establishment Clause grounds for establishing a religious preference, the case
presented the question whether public statements by a presidential candidate
presaging a policy decision targeting Muslims could be introduced in a challenge to a
policy action widely understood (and arguably explicitly embraced as) the one
promised during the campaign. 23 Despite the use of government actors’ public
statements in the North Carolina case mere months beforehand, the Government
strenuously insisted that looking at candidate Trump’s statements would be
improper—ensuring that the most powerful evidence of impermissible motive be kept
at bay—and of course calling for the case to be resolved without the President, unlike
Office Yanez, testifying.24

These cases—all from a single four-month period in 2017—suggest judicial use of the
term discriminatory intent is widespread. Yet they also pivot on quite different
conceptions of discriminatory intent. Bias can be invidious; neutral and functional; a
matter of the classifications used by state actors; or perhaps implicit and unconscious.
Moreover, the cases are suggestive of uncertainty in regard to the evidentiary strategies
that may be employed to surface relevant motivation. Official statements, statistics,
extrinsic circumstances, and the routine tools of discovery such as depositions and
interrogatories—all these float in and out of view.
It should not surprise anyone that ideas of ‘discrimination’ and ‘discriminatory
intent’ should prove controversial. To the extent they are entangled with notions of
equality, it has long been clear that the latter is “itself … many different notions, each an
20

Sarah Horner, Witness testimony from the Jeronimo Yanez trial: A Summary, MINNEAPOLIS STAR, June
15, 2017, http://www.twincities.com/2017/06/15/yanez-trial-with-jury-in-4th-day-of-deliberations-hereswhat-witnesses-said-at-trial/.
21
For a recent summary of those studies, see Joshua Correll et al., The police officer's dilemma: A decade
of research on racial bias in the decision to shoot, 8 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCH. COMPASS 201, 207
(2014) (concluding on the basis of several experimental studies that police have a “prepotent tendency to
shoot” African-American subjects, but exploring ways this tendency can be managed through training).
22
Executive Order No. 13769, Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.
82 Fed. Reg. 8977.
23
Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2086 (2017) (per curiam). The Court
here uses a declarative statement to the effect that such campaign statements are not admissible-. But the
statement is embedded in a larger discussion of the government’s position, and is thus not plausibly read as
a stand-alone holding.
24
Id.
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element in its grammar.” 25 A recent wave of philosophical reflection on the term
discrimination, moreover, has revealed a range of possible understandings of the term.
These efforts have not led to a focus on intent in the constitutional sense. Deborah
Hellman, for example, has identified a class of “demeaning” classifications applied in the
context of power asymmetries as the core moral wrong of discrimination.26 Benjamin
Eidelson concurs that “core cases of wrongful discrimination” involve acts that “manifest
disrespect for the discriminatees as persons.”27 In contrast, Tarunabh Khaitan has argued
that the “point” of antidiscrimination law is “to secure an aspect of the well-being of
persons by reducing the abiding, pervasive, and substantial relative disadvantage faced by
members of protected groups.”28 In somewhat similar terms, Sophie Moreau offers a
liberty-based account of antidiscrimination law as a protection of “deliberative freedom”
to make decisions about how to live “insulated from pressures stemming from extraneous
traits.”29 When sophisticated exegetes of the moral right of discrimination diverge so
widely, we should not be surprised when Justices—who are walled apart by both partisan
and jurisprudential disagreements—should come to vest a single term with many
different meaning.
My aim in this Article is hence neither to adjudicate between competing
philosophical accounts of discrimination nor to castigate the Justices for their
inconstancy. Instead, I hope to provide a clear mapping of how the slippery concept of
‘discriminatory intent’ works in practice, and a new perspective on the distributive
consequences of that practice. To the end, the Article maps out two sources of judicial
discretion in constitutional doctrine.30 The first involves the kind of discriminatory intent
alleged. The second concerns the manner in which it is proved or refuted in different
institutional contexts. How courts translate and then implement the general idea of
discriminatory intent determines how and when norms embedded in the First and
25

DOUGLAS RAW, EQUALITIES 132 (1981). A different version of this point is Peter Westen’s celebrated
argument that equality, in the legal context, derived its meaning wholly from extrinsic sources. Peter
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 (1982) (contending that “the idea of
equality is logically indistinguishable from the standard formula of distributive justice”).
26
DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 29-35 (2008). For a crisp formulation of
Hellman’s nuanced claim, see Deborah Hellman, Equal Protection in the Key of Respect, 123 YALE L .J.
3036, 3046-47 (2014) (“[D]iscrimination is wrong when it is demeaning. … Demeaning has two parts,
which I call the expressive dimension and the power dimension. An action, policy, or practice demeans if it
expresses that the person or people affected are less worthy of equal concern or respect and if it is the
action, policy, or practice of a person or entity that has the power or capacity to put the other down.”).
27
BENJAMIN EIDELSON, DISCRIMINATION AND DISRESPECT 6 (2015).
28
TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 91 (2015).
29
Sophia Moreau, What Is Discrimination?, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 143, 147 (2010).
30
In order to keep the analysis manageable, I focus here on constitutional law, and not on the statutory law
of discriminatory intent. For one analysis of relevant federal statutes that addresses some of the same
theoretical issues, see Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs,
and the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399 (2006). More generally, the employment discrimination literature is
focused on defining the ‘right’ kind of intent for statutory liability. Compare David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 915-19 (1992) (advocating a negligence
standard), with Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1159 (2017)
(advocating a recklessness model); Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and
Proximate Cause, U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2013) (suggesting that a negligence standard has not been
adopted). This is a distinct normative inquiry from the taxonomical analysis I pursue here.
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Fourteenth Amendment check official action.31 Accordingly, by carefully parsing the
ways in which these ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions have been answers, it is possible to
develop a better understanding of the normative choices implicit in the present doctrine—
and in particular to identify a set of distributive consequences.
Consider first what the term ‘discriminatory intent’ means when it comes to traits
such as race, ethnicity, alienage, and gender. 32 The term is commonly used
interchangeably with words like motivation, purpose, and animus. It can profitably be
understood to encompass legal theories of antidiscrimination account for the mental state
of the alleged malefactor. Intent is hence commonly understood as distinct from, and
even at war with a consequence-focused conception of disparate impact.33 In this Article,
I use the term ‘discriminatory intent’ to capture any theory of antidiscrimination liability
that turns on the psychological processes of the alleged discriminator. This means that my
taxonomy and analysis capture as much of the law as possible. Moreover, it enables
consideration of the extent to which core conceptions of discrimination are related to
what at first blush might seem unrelated concepts, such as a ‘colorblind’ anticlassification
rule.
With that in mind, the seemingly simple concept of discriminatory intent can be
disaggregated into at least five distinct strands. First, perhaps the most intuitive meaning
of discriminatory intent is action taken as a result of “a bare congressional desire to harm
31

My analysis here is focused on the Constitution’s norms of antidiscrimination that protect vulnerable
social groups based on suspect classifications such as race and religion. “Discriminatory intent” is relevant
in other doctrinal contexts—but the relevant conceptions of bias in those other fields is narrower and more
specific, and therefore does not raise the same concerns of conceptual pluralism and evidentiary approach
as the Equal Protection Clause and Religion Clauses. For example, the First Amendment’s Free Speech
Clause is violated if an official acts “out of a desire to prevent … first Amendment [activity].” Hefferman v.
City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016). Other than this reference to the narrow idea of retaliatory
intent, however, Free Speech has tended to avoid doctrinal tests that direct judicial attention narrowly to
motivation. Now Justice Elena Kagan, though, has argued that First Amendment doctrine “comprises a
series of tools to flush out illicit motives and to invalidate actions infected with them.” Elena Kagan,
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996). Even Kagan, however, does not content this function is explicit in doctrinal
formulations, or that judges directly ascertain the motives of official actors. Id. Similarly, the dormant
Commerce Clause, in contrast, is tailored around a more discrete concern with “regulatory measures
designed to benefit in-state economic interests.” Wyoming v. Oregon, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). This conception of discrimination is also relatively narrow in comparison to
the more complex conceptions at work in the Equal Protection and Religion Clause contexts.
32
The idea of discrimination also arises under the Dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., South Cent. Bell
Telephone Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 169 (1999). But the kind of discrimination at issue in Dormant
Commerce Clause cases is distinct and different from the kind at issue in Equal Protection and First
Amendment cases. The former is a species of economic dealing, most often by legislatures directed at a
large group of faceless nonresidents not modeled as possessing any distinctive traits. The gap between this
notion of discrimination and the notion at stake in the Equal Protection and First Amendment contexts is
sufficiently large that it seems unwise to conflate the concepts.
33
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 495
(2003) (identifying the possibility that “equal protection might affirmatively prohibit the use of statutory
disparate impact standards”). There are also conceptual approaches to antidiscrimination law that align
disparate treatment and disparate impact as two means of achieving the same goal. Noah D. Zatz, Disparate
Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1359–60 (2017) (arguing that a form of
“status causation” underpins both species of liability).
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a politically unpopular group,” 34 or another aversive view of the group. Second,
constitutional scrutiny can also be triggered when a suspect classification is used not out
of a desire to harm, but because it is a more efficient source of information about how to
achieve a licit goal than readily available alternatives. Race, for example, might be
thought to predict partisan identity. Or religion can be taken as a proxy for terrorism risk.
(This is distinct from the idea that a licit trait might be employed as a proxy for an
impermissible criterion). A third possibility is that a discriminatory intent is present on
any occasion upon which the relevant criterion plays a role in government decisionmaking. This is often known as an “anticlassification” principle.35 The latter is easy to
view as focused on the content of the law, rather than the quality of decision-makers
intentions.36 But it is a mistake to think of anticlassification as exhausted by a concern
with the facial content of the law. The logic of anticlassification is also necessarily
concerned with the quality of official intentions, in addition to the content of legal texts.
Fourth, an impermissible classification can work a marker of the boundary between two
hierarchically arranged social groups even when applied in a seemingly neutral and evenhanded way. This ‘social group polarization’ approach illuminates several early decisions
concerning laws that formally applied in even-handed ways, but is rarely mentioned now.
Finally, a prohibited classification might play a subtler psychological role—one that the
official in question might not immediately recognize because of implicit bias or the
culpable failure to account for structural inequalities.
These different conceptions are difficult to distinguish sharply. They have fuzzy,
overlapping boundaries. Rather than frankly recognize plurality and overlapping
conceptualizations of discriminatory intent, however, federal courts treat the concept as
unitary. Each of these aforementioned conceptions, as a result, can be glimpsed at work
in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence of discriminatory intent. The result is that
judges retain considerable discretion to move between different versions of
discriminatory intent. How this discretion is exercise, I will argue, can raise substantial
normative questions because it can reflect differential evaluation of the important of
discrimination-related harms depending on the identities of the perpetrator and the state
actor.
There is a second reason why the jurisprudence of discriminatory intent remains
unpredictable. The presence of discriminatory intent can be proved up in one of a number
of ways. Five evidentiary tactics stand out. First, a judge might look at the superficial,
semantic content of a decision—the text of a law or an executive order, for example.
Second, she might look to the oral statements of the relevant decision-maker. Third, that
decision could be situated in its context by looking upstream at the sequence of events
leading up to its execution and then downstream to its consequences. This context may
well provide powerful circumstantial evidence of an improper motivation. Fourth, it some
34

United States Department of Agriculture v Moreno, 413 US 528, 534 (1973).
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) ( “[T]he anticlassification … principle holds that the
government may not classify people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category:
for example, their race.”).
36
Cf. id. (identifying intentional discrimination as a supplement case that might “also” count as a violation
of the anticlassification principle, and not a core case).
35
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cases the motivations of the relevant government actor can be directly probed using wellworn instruments of civil discovery, such as depositions and interrogatories. Fifth, a
judge might consider statistical evidence derived from an econometric analysis to the
effect that an impermissible classification played a role in government decision-making.
Despite having embraced all of these evidentiary instruments in the mid-1970s,
when intent was first coming into its doctrinal ascendancy, the Court has since
backpedalled, albeit in fits and starts, and without any overt recognition that changes in
the kinds of evidence available to show bias lead inexorably to changes in the kinds of
bias that can successfully be challenged in Court. This untheorized and sub rosa
reorientation of constitutional antidiscrimination law should provoke concern not only
because it has been subject to no careful judicial or academic scrutiny, but also because it
has operated as a subterranean way of changing the reach and coverage of the
Constitution’s foundational protections for vulnerable minorities. Further, I will argue,
the Courts reallocation of evidentiary resources reflects flawed institutional and
predictive judgments.
Discriminatory intent plays a large role in many contemporary policy flashpoints.
It bubbles to the surface of national debate over the so-called travel ban, the persistence
of police violence against African-American men and women,37 or the cyclic resurgence
of contestation about affirmative action.38 More generally, recent events in the public
sphere have demonstrated that even the most naked and virulent forms of animus
continue to mar the American public sphere. Their influence on officials empowered with
the enormous discretionary authorities of government today cannot be dismissed out of
hand. In this context, rigorous and fair-minded thinking about how to define and discover
discriminatory intent is surely warranted.
My focus on the concept of discriminatory intent, and the mechanics of its
substantiation in court, is a departure from the literature’s dominant concerns. There is
now abundant scholarly commentary on what might be called the grand theories of
equality or religion threading through the Constitution. 39 Questions of how
37

See Roland G. Fryer, Jr, An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Uses of Force 3 (July
2016), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/main-july_2016.pdf (identifying racial disparities in use of
police force, but not police shootings).
38
See Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. to Take On Affirmative Action in College Admissions, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/01/us/politics/trump-affirmative-actionuniversities.html?hpw&rref=us&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=well-region&region=bottomwell&WT.nav=bottom-well (noting renewed interest among political branches for enforcing limits on
affirmative action).
39
In respect to the Equal Protection Clause, important recent scholarship focuses on overarching goals and
broad, synoptic judgments. See, e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 154
(2016) (contending that “the Supreme Court has steadily diminished the vigor of the Equal Protection
Clause in most respects”); Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2013)
[hereinafter “Siegel, Equality Divided”]. A number of recent articles, however, critique specific elements of
the judiciary’s framework for implementing the idea of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter,
Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183. In addition, Richard Fallon has
offered a searching critique of the idea of legislative intent more generally. Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523 (2016). My discussion of
impermissible intent in the legislative context overlaps in focus with Fallon’s piece. My aim, however, is to
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discriminatory intent is defined and proved tend to be ancillary and subordinate to a
larger critique of the ideological orientation of the doctrine. 40 In contrast, the only
extended study of the manner by which judges discover discriminatory intent is almost
twenty-years old.41
My argument proceeds in four steps. Part I begins by charting the ascendency of
discriminatory intent as a touchstone of liability under the Equal Protection and Religion
Clauses. The following Part develops the observation that ‘intent’ is not a singular
concept, but better understood as encompassing an array of different possibilities. It
offers an analytically generic typology of meanings. Part III catalogs on the evidentiary
instruments available for identifying impermissible motives. One inference that follows
from the taxonomy is the absence of any obvious or neutral work of putting into practice
the idea of discriminatory intent. As in any craft, the choice of tools changes the nature of
the ultimate product. Normatively freighted choices are simply unavoidable. The final
Part pivots to critique of the Court’s observed choices on the basis of their distributive
and epistemic effects—that is, the way in which they allocate scarce judicial resources
between different victims of discrimination, and the way in which they have the potential
to shape public understandings of discrimination’s moral harm.

understand how judicial scrutiny of legislative intent interacts with judicial scrutiny of other officials’
motivations under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In contrast, recent Religion Clause scholarship
focuses on precise doctrinal questions related to the hotly contested question of accommodations from
generally applicable laws, see, e.g., Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: ComplicityBased Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015), and the status of corporate
entities, see Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015).
40
One recent major contribution, by the Critical Race theorist Ian Haney-López argues that the Justices
have “split equal protection into the separate domains … , one governing affirmative action and the other
discrimination against non-Whites” in a move that has made it systematically easier for white plaintiffs to
prevail. Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1828 (2012). He asserts that the
Court has “rejected inquiring into the thoughts of individual government actors.” Id. at 1795. He also
harshly criticizes the turn to intent and the refusal to distinguish remedial from “oppressive” race-conscious
measures. Id. at 1805-06, 1815-6. Unlike Haney-López, I do aim here to critique the Court’s conception of
Equal Protection. Indeed, I read the doctrine as remaining more open and pluralistic than he does.
Moreover, unlike him, I focus on the shifting conceptual and evidentiary methods under the rubric of
discriminatory intent as the causal mechanism through which the focus of the courts has shifted.
41
See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO.
L. REV. 279 (1997). Selmi’s central claim is that “the Court has only seen discrimination, in the most overt
or obvious situation—situations that could not be explained on any other basis than race.” Id. at 284.
Whereas Selmi focuses on the narrowing of the intent inquiry, my aim is to explore the range of
definitional, analytic, and empirical options at play in the judicial discernment of discriminatory intent.
Another earlier article critiques the counterfactual method of ascertaining unlawful intent as impossible to
implement. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1113-14
(1989). In my view, the counterfactual method for analyzing discriminatory intent is simply a way of
framing the question whether unlawful intent is at work, and not a way of answering that question. Finally,
a recent student note draws on conceptions of intent from psychology to argue that foreseeable harms
should be treated as intentional. Julia Kobick, Discriminatory Intent Reconsidered: Folk Concepts of
Intentionality and Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 517, 519-20 (2010).
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I.

The Rise and Rise of Discriminatory Intent

This Part recapitulates the emergence of discriminatory intent as a touchstone of
jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause and the Religion Clause. My account of
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence focuses largely on race, where the key precedents
were handed down. I discuss case-law on other suspect classifications and fundamental
rights only insofar as they are pertinent to the ascendency of intent.
A.

The Equal Protection Clause.

Enacted later, but interpreted quicker than other parts of the Constitution, the
Equal Protection Clause generated a jurisprudence of intent within the first two decades
of its ratification—at least in respect to administration of the laws if not to legislation.42
There was nothing inevitable about this doctrinal move. The Court’s first major
interpretation of the Clause, in the 1879 case of Strauder v. West Virginia, did not hinge
on intent.43 Strauder concerned a state statute that limited jury service to “white male
persons … twenty-one years of age.” 44 Invalidating the conviction of an AfricanAmerican man under this regime, the Court found the failure of formal equality on the
face of the statute to violate the Constitution’s “immunity from inequality of legal
protection” without looking at its drafters’ intentions.45 It was the “statute,” the Court
explained, that “discriminated” in the sense of unevenly extending the protection of state
law.46 Later cases suggested that the complete exclusion of African-Americans from
juries could be prima facie evidence of a constitutional violation,47 and that defendants
were constitutionally entitled to introduce evidence of such exclusion.48 But the analytic
focus of jury exclusion cases did not pivot far before the Court imposed increasingly
stringent evidentiary requirements that effectively foreclosed Strauder challenges.49
Seven years after Strauder, however, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court was
presented with a habeas petition from a Chinese national convicted under a San Francisco
municipal ordinance for the licensing of laundries.50 Although the petitioner attacked the
42

The leading accounts of the Equal Protection Clause’s adoption emphasize the divergence of views
among those who debated and adopted the measure. E.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 126, 131 (1988); John P. Frank &
Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of “Equal Protection of the Laws,” 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421,
432.
43
100 U.S. 303 (1879).
44
Id. at 308 (citation omitted).
45
Id. at 310.
46
Id. For an extension of this logic, see Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1883) (rejecting a challenge
to a statute that imposed higher penalties on inter-racial rather than intraracial fornication because
“[e]quality of protection under the laws implies not only accessibility by each one, whatever his race, on
the same terms with others to the courts of the country for the security of his person and property, but that
in the administration of criminal justice he shall not be subjected, for the same offense, to any greater or
different punishment”).
47
Neal v. State of Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880).
48
Carter v. State of Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 449 (1900).
49
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v.
West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1462-63 (1983).
50
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 356 (1886)
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ordinance both on its face and as applied, the Court focused solely on the motives behind
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.51 The Justices focused on how the ordinance had
been enforced against Chinese nationals, but not non-Chinese, to draw an inference about
the “hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which, in the
eye of the law, is not justified.”52 Absent evidence of discriminatory intent, the Court was
to clarify in a later case (again, involving regulatory consistency in San Francisco), no
Equal Protection challenge would stand.53 Stauder and Yick Wo thus reflect distinct
doctrinal potentialities embedded in the Equal Protection Clause.54
Yick Wo’s immediate implications, as is well known, were stifled by the federal
judiciary’s endorsement of state-enforced segregation. This culminated, of course, in
Plessy v. Ferguson. While not disavowing Yick Wo, the Plessy Court nonetheless
forestalled inquiry into the motives of state actors by suggest that any “badge of
inferiority” flowing from segregation arise “because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it.”55 In so doing, Plessy undercut arguments about official intent by
placing blame for racial stratification on “social preferences” and the “general sentiment
of the community.”56 Since the Justices then likely approved of racial segregation as
public policy,57 they were hardly likely to perceive improper motive at work at work in
Louisiana’s segregation of railroad passengers.58
Only in the late twentieth century, as the Court worked though the implications of
the majestic generalities of Brown v. Board of Education59 did the role of intent came to
the fore once more. Brown repudiate Plessy’s conclusion that de jure segregation had no
direct impact on African-Americans’ “status in the community.”60 But otherwise the
Court’s opinion in Brown did not clarify “which conception of discrimination [the Court]

51

Id. at 373.
Id. at 374.
53
Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 508 (1905) (noting that petitioner had failed to show that there were
non-Chinese-owned establishments that had been spared enforcement).
54
The theme of normative pluralism runs like through the best historical scholarship on the Fourteenth
Amendment’s enactment. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 63 (1955) (finding in the enactment history of the Fourteenth Amendment
“no specific purpose going beyond the coverage of the Civil Rights Act is suggested; rather an awareness
on the part of these framers that it was a constitution they were writing, which led to a choice of language
capable of growth”); accord DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 349 & n.143, 350 n.148 (1985) (suggesting that the Equal Protection
Clause was understood initially only to apply to “remedial” or “protective” functions of state government).
One consequence of the diversity of original public understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment is that
there is necessarily a measure of interpretive space for doctrinal pathways as diverse as Strauder and Yick
Wo.
55
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
56
Id. at 551.
57
Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 332 (1998).
58
Hence the Court’s failure, twelve years after Plessy, even to inquire into the motives behind a Kentucky
law that prohibited integrated colleges. Berea College v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 57
(1908) (upholding the measure as a valid exercise of the state’s police power n respect to corporations)
59
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60
Id. at 494.
52
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embraced, or how far the principle of [Equal Protection] extended.”61 Over the next two
decades, the ensuing desegregation litigation did not require the Court to select a “precise
identification of the objectionable aspect of racial classifications.”62 Only when the city
of Jackson, Mississippi, closed its public swimming pools to avoid court-ordered
integration was the Court confronted with a state action clearly motivated by an improper
animus and also evenhanded in its semantic content and effect.63 A closely divided Court
held that the “bad motives” of the measures legislative supporters did not bear on its
constitutionality.64
This rule did not endure. Faced with a turn by lower courts to a disparate impact
standard,65 the Court in 1976 in Washington v. Davis held that “the basic equal protection
principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”66 Much criticized as the time,
Washington explicitly rested on a concern about the destabilizing effects of a
constitutional effects rule. But the fact the Court had a clear idea of what it disfavored did
not mean it understood the alternative approach standard it was embracing.67 Indeed,
because the Justices in Washington faced a record with no evidence of such invidious
purpose,68 they had no need do no more than reject a disparate impact standard (albeit
without, necessarily rejecting evidence of a disparate impact as probative of a
discriminatory intent). It had no need to reckon with the different ways an impermissible
classification might figure in a decisional process.
Nor did the cases that followed immediately on Washington v. Davis’s heels
elucidate those questions. Instead, the Court initially took a sweeping view of the kinds of
evidence admissible to demonstrate discriminatory intent69—an element of the doctrine I
shall explore at greater length below—and a narrow view of when the Constitution was
violated in cases of mixed motives.70 But it became rapidly apparent that the Court’s
61

David Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and Taming of Brown, 59 U CHI. L. REV. 935, 947 (1989)
[hereinafter “Strauss, Discriminatory Intent”].
62
Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 296
(1991).
63
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
64
Id. at 225; for early critical commentator that anticipated later judicial criticisms, see Paul Brest, Palmer
v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95.
65
See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev’d, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Bridgeport
Guardians, Inc. v. Members of the Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm., 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973).
66
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
67
Id. at 248 (“A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling
justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far-reaching and
would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes ….”). For early criticism, see Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate
Impact or Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977).
68
To the contrary, the case involved a personnel test administered by the Washington, D.C. police
department, and the record contained evidence of the “affirmative efforts of the Metropolitan Police
Department to recruit black officers.” Davis, 426 U.S. at 246.
69
See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
70
See Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (proof of discriminatory purpose requires
showing that government decision-maker “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”). Feeney thus
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approach to allegations of unconstitutional bias against a protected group were not bound
by any disciplining procedure or logic. Instead, they could oscillate abruptly between
cases. An example of such inconsistency is the different treatment of circumstantial
evidence can be found in two cases wherein at-large voting systems were challenged as
tainted by discriminatory intent. One of these cases elicited a studied refusal to account
for the circumstantial evidence of intent,71 while the other generated a careful tallying of
such clues.72 Unsurprisingly, the two cases yielded different results.
Ambiguity about the precise nature of the discriminatory intent that lay at the
heart of an Equal Protection violation became generative rather than paralyzing. Without
the encumbering sense of a fixed point of analytic departure, the Supreme Court
developed a doctrinal framework in which subtly distinct notions of intent played a role.
Within the race context, the Court increasingly devoted its scare resources to the
government’s use of “race-based measures” that classified using race on their face.73 Any
occasion on which “the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of
individual racial classifications,” the Court cautioned,” would lead to “strict scrutiny.”74
As we shall see in Part II, its approach to allegations of improper bias against minorities
has oscillated wildly, yielding inconsistent results across cases.75 In a different line of
cases, it has emphasized that “a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group” is a
governmental motive that clashes with the Equal Protection Clause.76 And in the context
of rules that overtly classify by gender, after some wobbling,77 the Court has settled into

narrowed the kinds of intention that counted for the constitutional purposes by excluding cases in which
racial effects were anticipated but intended. Some commentators treat the case as a ruling on the evidence
that can be used to demonstrate unlawful intent. Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 39, at 19. But Feeney
does not preclude the evidentiary use of a law’s consequences to gauge intent. Rather, it directs that certain
kinds of intent are not inconsistent with the Constitution.
71
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 73 (1976) (describing evidence of bias as most tenuous and
circumstantial). But see Selmi, supra note 41, at 310-11 (pointing out persuasive evidence of “the
perpetuation of an all-white local election scheme in Mobile” that was available to the Court but ignored).
72
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 625-26 (1982) (carefully accounting for evidence of bias and invalidating
Burke County, Georgia’s redistricting scheme).
73
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (“Federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a
compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.”).
74
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007); see also
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (describing the use of such classifications as “pernicious”
(citation omitted)).
75
See infra Part II.B.
76
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985); United States Dept. of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973); see also Lyng v. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace &
Agr. Implement Workers of Am., UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370, n.8 (1988) (characterizing such motives as
“illegitimate”). The Court also uses the term “animus” to capture the same idea. United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (describing the bare desire to harm as an “improper animus or purpose”);
accord Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
77
For example, the Court that pregnancy discrimination in state insurance coverage fell outside the
compass of Equal Protection was justified by the assertion that there was “no risk from which men are
protected and women are not.” Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974). Geduldig fails to inquiry
into stereotypes or impermissible intent, placing it in the category of disparate impact cases (although one
that was likely wrongly decided even on those terms).
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the practice of asking whether a legal distinction is “in reliance on [s]tereotypes about
women's domestic roles.”78
Hence, while the idea of “discriminatory intent” has since 1976 served as an
organizing principle in Equal Protection jurisprudence, the Court has not hewed to a clear
and specific understanding of such “intent.” Whereas some lines of cases underscore the
distinctively negative or aversive quality of unconstitutional purposes, other lines of cases
turn on the stereotypical content of the government’s intent. And yet other lines of case
make the assumption that the mere presence of race as a criterion in a process of
government decision-making suffices to trigger a constitutional worry. Even within the
bounds of Equal Protection jurisprudence, therefore, the idea of an unconstitutionally
discriminatory intent has become remarkably diverse since 1976.
B.

The Religion Clauses

Government motive—and in particular an intention to discriminate either for or
against religion, or between denominations—has loomed large since the inception of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. It has also come to play an increasing pivotal role in
Free Exercise cases since the early 1990s. As in the Equal Protection context, the Court
has identified the government actor’s intentions as analytically pivotal, rather than its
consequences, or its impingement on some fixed and discernable “immunity” that a
private individual can assert under the Constitution.79 As in the Equal Protection context,
the doctrinally relevant sense of ‘intent’ consistently reflects some kind of binary
opposition in which religion (or a particular denomination) is either favored or
disfavored. In some iterations, the psychological and processual quality of the term
‘intent’ frays, ceding ground to a more objective seeming inquiry into an externally
determined ‘purpose.’ But still the doctrine at its core maintains, albeit as one element of
many, an idea that certain motivations are unconstitutional because they entail a
discrimination on religion-related grounds.80

78

Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017) (citing Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (expressing similar
concern about laws based on “archaic and overbroad generalizations”); accord Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). The intent requirement in gender Equal Protection
jurisprudence has traveled a crooked path. Klarman, supra note 62, at 304 (noting the “apparently chaotic”
character of the early gender jurisprudence). Five years after Washington v. Davis, for example, the Court
upheld California’s statutory rape law against a challenge that it discriminately targeted men alone. Michael
M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 471–72 (1981). Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist parenthetically noted the petitioner’s argument that the statute “rests on archaic stereotypes,” but
rejected this contention with a citation to United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Michael M., 450
U.S. at 472 n.7.
79
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16, 55 (1913) (“[A]n immunity is one's freedom from the legal power or “control” of another as
regards some legal relation.”).
80
My reading of the doctrine differs from others who find intentionality only in very recent Supreme Court
doctrine. Caroline Mala Corbin, Intentional Discrimination in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 67
ALA. L. REV. 299, 302 (2015) (dating the role of intent in Establishment Clause analysis to the 2015 case of
Town of Greece v. Galloway).
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Until 1947, the Supreme Court had decided only two Establishment Clause cases.
Neither of those left any enduring impact upon the law.81 In its first major engagement
with the Clause, the Court upheld a decision by Ewing Township, New Jersey, to provide
free transportation to all non-profit schools, including sectarian ones.82 In influential
dicta, the Court spelled out a synoptic understanding of the Clause that prohibited certain
measures based on their effect, and in particular whether they “aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another.” 83 Fourteen years later, upholding
Maryland’s Sunday closing laws, the Court subtly reformulated the doctrinal test to train
upon the “purpose and effect” or challenged laws.84 The Court two years later examined
the “purpose” of a Pennsylvania town’s statute mandating that school days begin with a
Bible reading to determine whether it was “secular.”85 And by 1971, the requirement of
“a secular legislative purpose” seemed a touchstone of Establishment Clause analysis.86
In many cases, this litmus test for constitutionality resulted in a close examination of the
state’s proffered justifications for a statute—often involving some form of aid to sectarian
educational institutions—to ascertain whether they were pretextual, rather than an
exposition of what how “purpose” in this context was conceptualized or ascertained.87 In
other cases, the Court disapproved of government action on the ground that it was
intended “to endorse or disapprove of religion.”88
Purpose plays a role now in two lines of Establishment Clause cases. The first
concerns the judicial analysis of physical fixtures such as displays, statutes, and
monuments alleged to “establish” religion in a quite concrete sense. The leading case
concerns the posting of the Ten Commandments in classrooms, but there are endless
variants.89 These cases, to be sure, do not involve a ‘discriminatory’ intent in the sense of
an invidious, negative view of a certain class. But they do involve an improper intention
respecting religion. They concern a mental state of ‘discrimination,’ that is, in roughly the
same way affirmative action. The latter trigger strict scrutiny not because they are taken
to be animated by a hatred of Caucasians, but rather “because racial characteristics so
81

Both involved federal spending on sectarian institutions. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908)
(sectarian schools); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (religiously affiliated hospital).
82
Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
83
Id. at 316.
84
McGowan v. State of Md., 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
85
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (rejecting proffered secular
motives). Earlier school prayer decisions had not rested on a finding of improper purpose, but on effects.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (“There can be no doubt that New York's state prayer program
officially establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer.”).
86
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971); accord Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394, (1983);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977).
87
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“[I]f the government, seeking
to further some legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all
who adequately further that purpose, then it is fair to say that any aid going to a religious recipient only has
the effect of furthering that secular purpose.”); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 687
(1970) (endorsing proffered reasons).
88
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
89
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (“The pre–eminent purpose for posting the Ten
Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature.”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (“The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.”).
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seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment”90 Establishment Clause scrutiny
of positive religious distinctions, by analogy, can be understood as constitutional suspect
in part because such classifications are also “so seldom … relevant.”
The most extended discussion of the role of the intentions and purposes of official
actors in Establishment Clause cases can be found in a 2005 plurality decision holding
unconstitutional the posting of the Ten Commandments in two Kentucky county
courtrooms. 91 The defendant counties had initially posted large, prominently visible
replicas of the Decalogue in courtrooms. Once challenged, they twice change their
exhibits to include an increasing plurality of secular images, including the Magna Carta
and the Declaration of Independence.92
Writing for a plurality, Justice Souter rejected the countries’ submission that the
idea of purpose was too inchoate to be operationalized by citing cases—including
Washington v. Davis—in which purpose was a touchstone of constitutional validity.93 An
understanding of “official objective emerges from readily discoverable fact,” argued
Justice Souter, pointing to the various contextual clues that could illuminate such
purpose. At the same time, he conceded that a strategic governmental actor could obscure
her motive, but contended that this posed no conclusive concern. In the Establishment
Clause, Souter argued, “secret motive stirs up no strife and does nothing to make
outsiders of nonadherents.”94 This might be read to suggest that the Establishment Clause
is necessarily under-enforced. Alternatively, it might be understood to connote that that
the Clause not concerned with the content of the psychological state of official actors, but
rather with the publically articulated understanding of that psychological state.
In my view, the first reading is more plausible. To begin with, as Richard
Schragger has observed, “a pervasive feature of the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is that the Court's stated doctrine is underenforced or is irrelevant to a
whole range of arguably pertinent conduct.” 95 Justice Souter’s statement simply
acknowledges that fact. More substantively, imagine a case in which official enact a
measure for wholly secular reasons, a measure that is reasonably perceived as motivated
by favor or disfavor for religion based on official statements at the time. Imagine further
that the official produce persuasive evidence that in fact secular grounds alone played a
role. It is hard to imagine that the measure would be invalidated because of its
impermissible intent. Rather, the question would be whether the perceived “endorsement”
of religion would constitute an independent violation of the Establishment Clause.96
90

Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989)).
91
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
92
Id. at 851-56.
93
Id. at 861.
94
Id. at 863.
95
Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause, 89 TEX. L. REV. 583, 585
(2011) (footnote omitted).
96
For the concept of endorsement, see, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (asking whether the state had impermissibly “sen[t] a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
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A second line of cases, in contrast, concerns measures that draw a distinction
between regulated parties based on denominational affiliation. In the seminal case in this
doctrinal strand, the Court in Larson v. Valente invalidated a Minnesota statute that drew
no facial distinction between denominations, but rather imposed reporting requirements
solely on religious organizations that solicited more than half of the funds from
nonmembers.97 In so doing, explained the Court, the statute drew “explicit and deliberate
distinctions between different religious organizations” depending on age and size.98 The
Court could have limited its analysis to the face of the statute, and indeed some
commentators treat Larson as a case about “religious classifications” alone.99 But it also
considered the measure’s “express design—to burden or favor selected religious
denominations led the Minnesota Legislature to discuss the characteristics of various
sects with a view towards ‘religious gerrymandering.’”100 A denominational preference,
therefore, exists not only when there is facial discrimination, but also when there is an
intent or “design” to “burden or favor selected religious denominations.”101
The path of Free Exercise doctrine has been more erratic, and the emergence of
discriminatory intent—foreshadowed somewhat in cases such as Larson—came later.
Until the end of the nineteenth century, the Free Exercise Clause was understood to draw
a distinction between impermissible laws that penalized “mere opinion” and those that
“reach[ed] actions … in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.”102 Its
they are insiders, favored members of the political community”); see also Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989) (engaging in an endorsement analysis based on
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch). Commentators have argued that the endorsement test is in
decline. See Adam Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-sorting Principles, 2005
SUP. CT. REV. 135, 144–58. And some Justices have vigorously attacked the endorsement test on the rare
occasions it has been employed to invalidate a measure with concededly secular purposes. Utah Highway
Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 565 U.S. 994 (2011) (Thomas J. dissenting from denial of certiorari).
97
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 230 (1982) (describing Minnesota Charitable Solicitation Act, Minn.
Stat. §§ 309.50–309.61).
98
Id. at 246 n.23.
99
E.g., Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses,
1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 324 (1995).
100
Larson, 456 U.S. at 254. In other cases involving a denominational preference challenge, however, the
Court did limit itself to the face of the statute. Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989) (reading
Larson to apply to cases of “facial preference[s]”). But other courts have discussed Larson as a
nondiscrimination rule. Children's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle, 212 F.3d 1084, 1090
(8th Cir. 2000).
101
For similar statements that seem to turn on government intent, see Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) (“It is part of our settled jurisprudence that ‘the Establishment Clause prohibits
government from abandoning secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one religion, or on religion
as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious organization.”’); Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 605 (1989) (“Whatever else the Establishment Clause may mean ... it certainly means at the very
least that government may not demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed ....”).
102
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). But see Murdock v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943) (invalidating municipal license tax on the same of religious
pamphlets as an improper “condition to the pursuit of” religious activities). It is noteworthy here that
Reynolds and Murdoch alike involved religious minorities—Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses—that were
at the time subject to considerable public contempt and discrimination. Kelly Elizabeth Phipps, Marriage
and Redemption: Mormon Polygamy in the Congressional Imagination, 1862-1887, 95 VA. L. REV. 435,
440-42 (2009) (summarizing anti-Mormon rhetoric in Congress in the 1880s); SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS,
JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION
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contemporary revival began with the 1963 decision of Sherbert v. Verner, in which the
Court invalidated a South Carolina unemployment compensation statute that excluded
those who declined employment on a Saturday—a measure with an unequivocal “secular
purpose,” as the dissenting Justice Harlan noted.103 Sherbert marked the beginning of a
sequence of Free Exercise decisions focused on the effects of challenged laws.104 But
intent was not wholly absent from the case-law. In 1978, for example, the Court
invalidated a Tennessee prohibition on ministers serving as delegates to a constitutional
convention.105 The Court warned that “government may not as a goal promote ‘safe
thinking’ with respect to religion and fence out from political participation those, such as
ministers, whom it regards as overinvolved in religion.”106
It was only at the beginning of the 1990s that the Court turned away from an
effects-based framework and embraced discriminatory intent as an analytic touchstone.107
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court rejected Free Exercise protection from the
incidental burdens on religious liberty created by neutral, generally applicable rules.108
Like Washington v. Davis’s repudiation of disparate impact in the Equal Protection
context, Smith’s rejection of Sherbert’s effects test was immediately controversial.109 As
in Washington v. Davis, judicial rejection of a test focused on consequences turned on its
anticipated destabilizing consequences rather than the merits of a competitor doctrinal
measure.110 Finally, just as in the Equal Protection context, the Court did not limit
instances of discrimination to cases in which a racial classification was present on the
textual surface of a law. Rather, in short order, the Court explained that the Free Exercise
Clause was equally offended by a facially neutral measure that evinced an impermissible
(2000) (documenting violence against Jehovah’s Witnesses in the early twentieth century). It is telling that
while the Court reached different results in those two cases, in neither instance did it identify or discuss the
possibility of a discriminatory intent.
103
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 421 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
104
See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemp't Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 137 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 709 (1981).
105
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
106
Id. at 641.
107
See Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1264 (2008) (concluding that in
general the government cannot target individual religious groups in regulations, barring extraordinary
circumstances). Intent-based tests do not exhaust the law of religious liberty. The effects test of Sherbert
remains the nub of statutory religious freedom protections under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2016); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751 (2014) (applying RFRA to federal mandate on employers to provide insurance plans covering
contraception). In addition, the Court has recently suggested identified religious institutions as bearers of a
still inchoate form of constitutional immunity. Hosana-Tabor Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694, 709 (2012). Neither of these lines of doctrine hinges on intent.
108
494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
109
Scholars of all stripes attacked Smith in unstinting terms. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of
Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10–23; Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 138–39 (1992).
110
Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (worrying that “[a]ny society adopting [an effects test for religious liberty claims]
would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of
religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them.”). It would be too facile to
respond that the pre-history of Free Exercise jurisprudence demonstrated the absence of such
destabilization. That the Sherbert regime had not destabilized may well have been a result of the Court
maintaining the social equilibrium by watering down the effects test to make it palatable in practice.
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intent on the part of the relevant institutional decision-maker. Invalidating a municipal
ordinance that prohibited ceremonial animal sacrifices required by Santeria ritual, but not
other like animal killings, the Court cautioned that “if the object of a law is to infringe
upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral” and
hence in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.111
C.

Intent and the Protection of Social Groups: A Summary

In both the Equal Protection and the First Amendment Religion Clause contexts,
the Supreme Court has moved from a focus on effects to an analysis trained in
government’s discriminatory intent or purpose. In the context of race-based claims and
Free Exercise claims, it has made this move for very similar reasons related to the
potential destabilizing effects of an effects test, but with a parallel dearth of close
attention to the embraced alternative. The Establishment Clause, in contrast, has been
characterized by attention to official purpose for much longer, and lacks the animating
concern with seismic repercussions from an effects-based rule. As the Court has become
more conservative over the last few decades, the purpose-focused strand of Establishment
Clause has come under increasing pressure, with one Justice even suggesting that
denominational preferences could be acceptable provided they tracked the historical
dominance of certain faiths.112 As this pressure increases, the treatment of racial and
religious classifications is likely to diverge: Whereas measures adopted to advance the
interests of one race are likely to remain subject to close constitutional scrutiny, it will be
easier for governments to undertake measures to promote either religion per se or (more
usually) majority faiths. Such measures will include moments of prayer in official
government functions, 113 programs of state aid that predictably promote sectarian
institutions,114 and official representations that endorse and promote religion.115
This partial congruence between the doctrinal treatments of race and religion is by
no means an obvious or inevitable development. Although religion is sometimes
111. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32, 546 (1993); id. at
534 (“The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as overt”
(emphasis added)).
112
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 888–94 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
government need not remain neutral between religion and nonreligion but can “acknowledg[e] a single
Creator”). To date, the rather startling idea that government can embrace and act upon overt hostility to
Buddhism, Hinduism, and other nonmonotheistic faiths has yet to gain formal traction in the case reporters.
113
See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (upholding rotating prayers at the
beginning of town’s meetings).
114
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653-54 n.2 (2002) (endorsing school vouchers
program, while acknowledging the risk that financial incentives might skew a program toward religious
schools; but ultimately concluding that so long as “neutral, secular” criteria were used no constitutional
problem obtained).
115
The legal treatments of racial and religious discriminations also diverge in respect to “how far [the
Constitution] limits government in affirmatively pursuing concerns related to religion or race.” Joy
Milligan, Religion and Race: On Duality and Entrenchment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 393, 396-97 (2012)
(arguing that the government has more “leeway” when it comes to race as opposed to religion). The Court,
however, has recently stated to narrow this difference. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v.
Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017) (striking down Georgia’s exclusion of religious entities from a
generally available funding program).
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enumerated as one of the suspected classifications under the Equal Protection Clause,116
antidiscrimination norms about race and religion have developed along doctrinally
separate tracks. In part, this is because the historical circumstances of extreme racial
stratification has a distinctive role in American history with no precise religious parallel
(although the twentieth century was woefully replete with examples of similarly extreme
subjugations of religious minorities in other parts of the world). Nevertheless, the design
of an antidiscrimination norm in respect to religion raises a question of symmetry akin to
the one that has haunted the question of racial equality. Given the existence of
identifiable and stable minority and majority groups, that is, should the jurisprudence
distinguish the different ways in which religious classifications can enter government
decision-making? The following Part explores the range of ways in which the idea of a
discriminatory intent can be understood—generating a taxonomy that illuminates not
only this question but the larger contours of antidiscrimination norms under the
Constitution.
II.

The Diversity of Discriminatory Intents

‘Discriminatory intent’ is not a unitary concept, but protean and plural. By
looking at the species of intent the Court has recognized, the kinds that it has rejected,
and the kinds that simmer away at the periphery of its vision, it is possible to snap into
focus the unavoidable diversity of discriminatory intent as a concept. Such diversity is
not intrinsically a problem: Many important terms in constitutional law have multiple
meanings. But the Court has failed to explicitly recognize that impermissible intent can
make one of several forms, and has thus failed to grapple with the imperative of
maintaining a diversity of evidentiary approaches. Its selectivity over evidentiary
methods—which cannot justified as an effort to match evidentiary tools to the various
forms of observed discriminatory intents—generates highly problematic outcomes.117
This Part steps back from the case-law and provides a general taxonomy of
‘discriminatory intent’ by drawing on economics, political science, and psychological
literature. I argue here that the term “discriminatory intent” encompasses a wide range of
possible operational understandings. I trace five potential understandings of
“discriminatory intent” by tacking back and forth between doctrine and extrinsic social
science evidence. Beyond demonstrating the plasticity of discriminatory intent, an
important pay-off from this analysis is that even doctrinal formulations that are generally
thought to work independent of intent (e.g., the anticlassification approach in Equal
Protection) turn out on closer inspection to be best understood as focused on the quality
and content of officials’ cognitive processes. A second payoff is that each conception of
discriminatory intent has fuzzy boundaries. It is far from clear what cases falls within
116

See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 596 (1895) (Field, J., concurring)
(suggesting that religion is a suspect classification), aff'd on reh'g, 157 U.S. 429 (1895), superseded on
other grounds by constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XVI. The issue remains unsettled in most
courts of appeals. Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended (Feb. 2,
2016) (“Perhaps surprisingly, neither our Court nor the Supreme Court has considered whether
classifications based on religious affiliation10 trigger heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.” (footnote omitted)).
117
See infra Part IV.A.
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each one. When the Court draws distinctions about what is inside and what beyond the
constitutional pale, the reasons for these divisions can hence be opaque or inconsistent.
Before turning to these variations, however, it is worth explaining why one wellrespected theory of discriminatory intent does not appear in the taxonomy. In an
influential 1989 article, David Strauss offered an influential “definition” of
discriminatory intent that turned on “reversing the groups,” and asking whether the same
decision would have been made had the adverse effects of government action fallen on
the majority rather than the minority.118 The counterfactual “reversing the groups” seems
to avoid direct inquiry into mental states, and instead call for a judicial reconstruction of
what government actors would have done but for the suspect classification at issue.
However, as Strauss observed (in an effort to demolish the coherence of a discriminatory
intent standard), the counterfactual inquiry requires a designation of which features of the
background world—including not just the identity of the parties but also “differences in
the size of the two groups and in their economic and social status, as well as the[ir]
history of relations”—would change and which would be held constant.119 He thought
this an infeasible inquiry.
But assume that the counterfactual is narrowly defined to focus on a change to the
identity of the affected party.120 A judge would then be required to decide whether the
official was moved by some-kind of race-specific reason. She would therefore have to
decide not only which sorts of race-specific reasons count for constitutional purposes, but
also would have to estimate their casual effect on the relevant decision. Reversing the
groups—at least when precisely applied to the transaction at stake—therefore simply
requires the judge to ask if an improper intent is at work. What ‘counts’ as an improper
intent remains to be determined.121 The “reversing the groups” lens, even in its simplest
form, hence serves as an analytic frame for, rather than as a resolution of, the difficult
question of how to define discriminatory intent.
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Strauss, Discriminatory Intent, supra note 61, at 956-57. The same test was proposed earlier by Eric
Schnapper, Two Categories of Discriminatory Intent, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 51 (1982).
119
Strauss, Discriminatory Intent, supra note 61, at 971.
120
Audit studies employing testers in retail and housing contexts employ this assumption. See, e.g., Ian
Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender in New Car Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304 (1995)
(finding race and gender effects by audit studies). But see James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 12
J. ECON. PERSPS. 101, 102 (1998) (noting “fragility” of findings from audit studies given “alternate
assumptions about unobserved variables and the way employment markets work”).
121
Strauss asserts that this captures both conscious and unconscious intent, but it could also captures
instances in which officials make different decisions because changing ascriptive identify changes the
social welfare effects of a decision. Id. at 960. But it is not clear how he would treat cases in which race
serves as a proxy for a valid character trait, such as criminality or partisan identity. This problem parallels
the principal barrier to causal identification in many econometric studies. Kerwin Kofi Charles & Jonathan
Guryan, Studying discrimination: fundamental challenges and recent progress, 3 ANN. REV. ECON. 479,
480-81 (2011) (“The main problem this line of inquiry confronts is that, in observational data, individuals
of different races may systematically differ with respect to other determinants of labor market outcomes
apart from race, including some that are unobserved.”).

23

A.

Animus as discriminatory intent: Taste-Based Discrimination

The simplest and perhaps most intuitive form of “discriminatory intent” is the
“disutility caused by contact with some individuals.”122 In a very influential body of
work, the economist Gary Becker has termed this “taste-based discrimination” and
deployed it as a conceptual device to model labor market dynamics with discriminatory
employers or co-workers.123 Becker’s model of taste-based discrimination focuses on the
market equilibrium that would result from employers averse to contact with minority
employees and thus willing to pay a premium to employ (equally skilled) non-minority
employers. The dynamic effect of this premium is to create a competitive advantage for
non-discriminating firms. The theory hence predicts that “[a]s long as there is a single
nondiscriminatory employer, all discriminators will be driven out of the market.”124 Of
course, the absence of market dynamics, and its substitution by democratic pressures,
means that no similar sorting effect can be counted on to work in government.125
Taste-based discrimination translates into the lexicon of constitutional doctrine as
“animus.” A measure may hence be invalid because its adoption was “born of animosity
toward the persons affected.”126 For example, in striking down Section 2 of the Defense
of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), the Court in United States v. Windsor focused on whether
that provision had the “purpose and effect of disproval of [a] class.”127 A prohibition on
animal sacrifices enacted by the residents of the Florida city of Hialeah out of “hostility”
toward the Santeria faith similarly rested on constitutional infirm ground. 128
Alternatively, amicus may enter into the constitutional analysis not because the decisionmaker is biased, but rather because she acts to the detriment of a person because of the
animus of third parties. For example, a state-court judge cannot deny custody to a parent
solely on the ground that her new spouse is African-American, such that the child will be
subject to less favorable social treatment once within her care.129
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GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14-15 (2d ed. 1971)
Id. at 14 (modeling taste-based discrimination as a “discrimination coefficient,” which “acts as a bridge
between money and net costs. Suppose an employer were faced with the money wage rate PI of a particular
factor; he is assumed to act as if PI(1 + di) were the net wage rate, with di as his [discrimination coefficient]
against this factor”). For a similar treatment of discrimination, see Harold Demsetz, Minorities in the
Market Place, 43 N.C. L. REV. 271, 271 (1965) (viewing “discrimination against” as an “aversion to
association’ with certain groups).
124
John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1422 (1986).
125
Deborah Hellman offers a different definition of animus focused on the intent to harm. See Deborah
Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination, 102 VA. L. REV. 895, 903 (2016) (“One way to fail to treat
someone as an equal is to intend to harm him-- to adopt a policy that burdens him not merely in spite of this
burden but deliberately because of it.”). I employ Becker’s because he attends to both the intent to harm,
and the intent to avoid, or to deny benefits, out of aversive sentiments.
126
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
127
United States v. Windsor, 33 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
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Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 541 (1993).
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Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the
law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”). I have characterized Palmore as concerned with
taste-based discrimination, but it can also be ranked as a case about statistical discrimination, see infra, in
the sense that the custody decision was based on an estimate on the expected welfare of the child under
different familial arrangements. The race of the parent, on this view, operated as a proxy for welfare.
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Windsor, which concerned DOMA’s denial of federal recognition to same-sex
marriages, illustrates an important distinction between Becker’s concept of taste-based
discrimination and the “animus” version of discriminatory intent in the constitutional
context. There are instances in which animus has taken a laboring oar, the effect of the
challenged measure has been to create physical separation from the protected class as
Becker predicted.130 But in Windsor, the effect of the challenged measure was not, as
Becker theorized, centrally to discourage contact with the maligned group. To be sure,
DOMA’s effect may well have been to suppress the public expression of gay unions, and
thus diminish the visibility of gay people and thereby to reduce contact with them.
Nevertheless, its main effect was not to promote physical separation from gays and
lesbians, but rather to delegitimize same-sex unions.
Windsor also points toward an ambiguity in the definition of animus. The idea of
taste-based discrimination connotes an almost physical repugnance toward the
disapproved group. As Martha Nussbaum has underscored, “disgust” of this form is
plausibly understood to propel what the Court calls animus.131 At the same time, it also
seems reasonable to think that the federal law challenged in Windsor was also animated
by a sense of moral disapproval that is not well captured by the concept if taste-based
discrimination. Indeed, in endorsing the right to same-sex marriage two years after
Windsor, the Court “emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious
doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine
precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned.”132 Since the Court’s decision
finding a right to same-sex marriage did not rest on a finding of animus, it had no cause
to ask whether a sincerely held moral theory can itself embed forms of contempt and
subordination that render it a form of animus. That question about the perimeter of the
“animus” form of discriminatory intent remains unexplored.133
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City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985).
Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 667, 683 (2010) (“The idea that same-sex
unions will sully traditional marriage therefore cannot be understood without moving to the terrain of
disgust and contamination.”); see generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY:
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010).
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Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). For a moral argument that seems to fall within this
category, see John. M. Finnis, Legal Enforcement of “Duties to Oneself”: Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437 (1987) (arguing that anti-gay legislation “may manifest, not contempt, but rather
a sense of the equal worth and human dignity of those people whose conduct is outlawed precisely on the
ground that it expresses a serious misconception of, and actually degrades, human worth and dignity, and
thus degrades their own personal worth and dignity, along with that of others who may be induced to share
or emulate their degradation”). It seems worth asking here whether Finnis’s position is empirically
plausible as a description of widely held views about gays. Cf. Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and
Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89, 116 (1997) (concluding that it is not).
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Perhaps the closest decision on point is Bob Jones University. v. United States, which upheld the
Internal Revenue Service’s decision to deny a religious college tax-exempt status because of its racially
discriminatory policies. 461 U.S. 574, 581 (1983) (describing policies). This suggests that animus
embedded in the rhetorical and ideological matrix of a legible faith system remains nonetheless animus.
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B.

Impermissible Criteria as Proxies for Licit Ends: The Problem of Statistical
Discrimination (with Attention to Double-Effect Doctrine)

The second leading theory of discrimination focuses on the informational role
played by salient characteristics such as gender or membership in a racial or religious
ascriptive group. 134 Economists dissatisfied with Becker’s theory of taste-based
preferences observed that such characteristics might be valuable if they operated as
proxies for other less observable characteristics. For example, an employer might believe
that African-Americans are less productive than Caucasian workers, and as a result
employ race as a proxy for productivity. On this view, employers use race as a proxy for
otherwise unobservable characteristics such as investments that workers make in terms of
habits of action and thought, steadiness, punctuality, responsiveness and initiative.135
Studies of labor markets confirm that observed racial differential in wages is due in part
to such “statistical discrimination.”136
A central difference between taste-based discrimination and statistical
discrimination is that the first concerns a state of desire while the second concerns a state
of belief.137 A taste-based discriminator has a preference in respect to future states of
affairs, and hence acts with an intention or a purpose to make those come about. A
statistical discriminator has a belief about the world, whether certain or probabilistic, one
that provides a basis for action toward an end that itself has no impermissible content.
These two categories are not absolutely distinct from one another. Consider, for example,
the idea of a stereotype, a generally pejorative term used to condemn certain
generalizations, and in particular generalizations with a negative character. 138 Some
stereotypes may be based on spurious correlations, or reflect the outcomes of third
parties’ prejudice (e.g., a belief that a certain racial minority is lazy may be premised on
comparatively higher unemployment rates that in turn are predicated on aversive
thinking). Others may be based on sound empirical foundations. And there is an
intermediate category in which the generalization is based on a morally flawed reading of
available data. Taste-based and statistical discrimination, in short, should not be assumed
to be acoustically separate from each other.
134

The leading papers are Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 659, 659 (1972), and Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination, 12
J. ECON. PERS. 91, 96 (1998).
135
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3, 24-27
(Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973) [hereinafter “Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination”] (“Skin
color and sex are cheap sources of information. Therefore prejudices (in the literal sense of pre-judgments,
judgments made in advance of the evidence) about such differentia can be easily implemented ….”).
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For powerful evidence from innovative experimental studies, see John A. List, The nature and extent of
discrimination in the marketplace: evidence from the field,’ 119 Q. J. ECON. 49, 49-50 (2004). Other
studies have identified evidence of taste-based discrimination by leveraging differences in black-white
racial preferences between states. Kerwin Kofi Charles & Jonathan Guryan, Prejudice and wages: an
empirical assessment of Becker's The Economics of Discrimination,’ 116 J. POL. ECON. 773, 773-74
(2008).
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Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 476 (1992) (drawing this
distinction).
138
FREDRICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES & STEREOTYPES 3-4 (2003). As Schauer observes,
“judgment without generalization is impossible,” such that it cannot be that all generalizations used as
heuristics are impermissible. Id. at 214-15.
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It is not immediately obvious why the Constitution should be concerned with the
epistemic use of an impermissible ground at all, provided the government’s ends are
legitimate and its beliefs untainted by animus. The case-law contains only fragments of
an answer. One theory might be that it is difficult or impossible to distinguish between
taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination, so that the latter must be
prohibited along with the former. In Justice O’Connor’s terms, taste-based discrimination
is “potentially so harmful to the entire body politic,” whereas “racial characteristics so
seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment,” that the two must be treated
alike.139 Her claim here may be that statistical discrimination is seldom effective, while
taste-based discrimination is so capable of being hidden, that a prophylactic rule is
required. Neither the Court nor commentators, however, have ever substantiated either
element of Justice O’Connor’s logic (or appealed to the argument above that taste-based
and statistical discrimination shade into each other). Nor is either element of Justice
O’Connor’s claim obviously true. The fact that race (for example) seems to provide
information for employers140 suggests that it may be epistemically useful in other policy
contexts. At the same time, it is far from clear that we cannot distinguish statistical
discrimination and taste-based discrimination in practice.
Alternatively, a constitutional prohibition on statistical discrimination might be
justified by analogy to the dynamic effects of statistical discrimination on human capital
acquisition for labor markets. As Glenn Lourey has pointed out, the existence of
statistical discrimination entails that the subordinate class (e.g., African-Americans in the
labor market) can expect to receive lower returns on investments in education.141 A
dynamic effect of statistical discrimination by race in current labor markets, Lourey
observed, is to disincentivize the acquisition of human capital by African-Americans.142
The generalizations upon which statistical discrimination are predicated, even if false at
their inception, become self-confirming over time. The question is then whether a similar
dynamic arises in the constitutional context when official distinctions, inaccurate in their
inception, cause behavior that renders them increasingly true over time. It is not at all
clear that doctrine under the First and the Fourteenth Amendment, however, evince any
such consciousness of the dynamic effects of law. As a result, the justification for
including discrimination as proxy within the constitutional prohibition (as opposed to
simply outside the domain of decent, sensible policy) remains to be stated.
Perhaps fittingly, doctrinal treatment of statistical discrimination—wherein the
relevant trait is deployed as a proxy for some otherwise licit end—has a hesitant and
equivocal quality. The border between permissible and prohibited states of mind here
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seems to divide cases that are more alike than different.143 On the one hand, where race is
used as a proxy for partisanship in the redistricting context, the Constitution is squarely
implicated.144 Similarly, when race is deployed as a proxy for risk when managing a
carceral population, that decision also elicits strict scrutiny.145 And when gender is used
as a proxy for a trait, based on some stereotype about men and women, the relevant law
receives heightened scrutiny.146 On the other hand, when race is employed as a trait in
police suspect descriptions federal courts have not expended significant effort in
considering their constitutionality.147 Insofar as contact with the police is the modal form
of interaction between the state and certain racial minorities (or, at least, men within that
minority group),148 this lacuna is a significant one.
Not only is the justification for a constitutional prohibition on statistical
discrimination unclear, its current borders are also problematic. The case in which the
normatively salient trait is used as a proxy for a licit end is distinct, but related in
interesting ways, to the case in which an official takes a decision aiming at a wholly licit
end by relying on a lawful classification, but does so with the knowledge that the adverse
effects of that decision will fall largely upon a protected class. What makes this case
interesting is the contingent fact of a high correlation between the lawful classification
selected and the impermissible classification. For example, the decision to reward
military veterans with employment-related preferences, or the decision to intensify
coercive street policing in urban neighborhoods with high levels of street-centered
narcotics transactions are both ones in which a reasonable decision-maker cannot but be
aware that her decision is predicated on a criterion that is functionally indistinguishable—
and, indeed, perhaps from the outside observationally equivalent to—a decision based on
the impermissible criterion.149
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In such cases, the Court has found no constitutional infirmity.150 The latter rule,
first announced in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, a case involving the gendered
effects of veterans’ employment-related benefits, tracks the Aquinian doctrine of double
effect that was reintroduced to modern philosophy by Philippa Foot whereby an
“oblique” intention in respect to an impermissible end is not usually fatal.151
But should all cases of double-effect be ranked as outside the domain of
constitutional concern given their distinction from instances of statistical discrimination?
Setting aside the difficult proof problems that might arise in determining what criterion
an official decision-making in fact employed, the question is a more different one than
generally realized. There are commonalities as well as differences between the Feeney
scenario and impermissible uses of statistical discrimination. Neither case involves a goal
that itself has an impermissible character. In both cases, the official is likely aware that
the impermissible criterion (race, ethnicity, or religion) is entangled, directly or
obliquely, with the means elected to accomplish the licit goal. What divides the cases is a
very specific and finely drawn form of intentionality: In one case, the official consciously
deploys that criterion, whereas in the other case the official knowingly ignores the role of
the normatively fraught classification as a marker of practical social difference in the
world. The intent to use (say) race as a proxy is constitutionally different from the
decision to use a functional substitute for race, but the moral quality and consequences of
those decisions track each other closely.152
Even accepting the salience of this distinction, it is generally recognized in both
legal and philosophical treatments of intention in double-effect cases that there is no hard
and fast boundary between direct and oblique intentions. Philosophers do not excuse the
terrorist, for example, on the ground that he intended only political change, whereas the
deaths he caused were merely obliquely intended. 153 Even if full information is available,
the distinction between direct and oblique intention must be drawn on the basis of
objective construals of intents, not the “idiosyncrasies of particular individuals and their
willful or perverse constructions of the purposes of their actions.”154 This principle is akin
to (although not precisely the same as) the familiar axiom of the law that people are
understood to intend the natural and foreseeable consequences of their actions.155 But if
the boundary between direct and oblique intention is necessarily drawn on the basis of an
objective construal of intent, then the double-effect scenarios described by Feeney
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necessarily raise the question of when an otherwise licit criterion is so closely and
predictably correlated with a normatively problematic criterion that the same
constitutional concerns are triggered.156 To my knowledge, courts have not engaged in
this inquiry.
To the extent the double effect doctrine itself provides a basis for the rule,
moreover, a powerful challenge by T.M. Scanlon to that argument holds that what
matters in such cases is not the quality of the actor’s intentions, but rather the availability
of objective justifications for the specific action.157 As I understand it, Scanlon’s framing
would not necessarily treat the veterans benefit case differently from the use of race as a
proxy for carceral risk (although, depending of the specific justificatory facts available,
may or may not yield a different distribution of outcomes). But the point here is that both
cases would be analyzed under a parallel rubric, and would stand or fall on the same
grounds.
C.

Anticlassification: Race and Religious Classifications as Discriminatory
Intent

Some bases for government decisions inflict such grave dignitary and stigmatic
harm merely by dint of their history or present circumstances that the mere fact of their
deployment can never be justified in terms of the balance of costs and benefits.158 These
concerns support an “anticlassificatory” approach to Equal Protection or the Religion
Clause. This has been understood to focus on the formal content of the formal
enunciations (i.e., a statute, regulation, or directive) issued by official actors of the formal
criterion used in an orally delivered order, although I shall argue that it sweeps more
broadly.
Most notably, the Court has deployed some version of an anticlassificatory lens in
present Equal Protection law in respect to race. That clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is summarized as a means of “protecting individuals from the harm of categorization by
race.”159 But it has taken a different path, in contrast, in its treatment of gender under the
Equal Protection Clause by dint of its focus on false and degrading stereotypes—a
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concern that reflects a concern with misguided statistical discrimination. 160 In the
Religion Clause context, the Justice has also taken a mixed path in which an
anticlassification logic plays a part, but does not explain all the cases. Hence, Douglas
Laycock has identified “formal neutrality,” or “the mere absence of religious
classifications,” as one element of Religion Clause doctrine.161 Formal neutrality entails
that financial aid be distributed in under terms that make no distinction between religious
and nonreligious entities and would prohibit regulatory exceptions exclusively drawn for
religious actors. Both of these positions are found in the current jurisprudence.162 There
are, however, many other areas of jurisprudence that formal neutrality does not
explain.163
An anticlassification rule seems at first blush to fall outside the domain of
discriminatory intent. That rule, viewed superficially, simply demands that judges
examine the formal content of the rule of decision deployed by a government actor. But
this is too quick for a number of reasons. As an initial matter, anticlassification rules must
bite on the cognitive content of government decision-makers’ behavior, in addition to the
formal context of laws and regulations, to have any practical effect in our system of
constitutional adjudication. That is, an anticlassification approach might be understood as
a directive that officials never deploy, in their own thinking, the relevant prohibited
ground as a criterion for decision whether openly or otherwise. This formulation focuses
on the content of the rules subjectively applied by the official, and asks whether the
cognitive process deployed to reach a decision, whether articulated or not, turned at any
point on an impermissible classification. In this sense, it is concern with reasons an
official has for acting—i.e., her intentions—and not the formal content of the law.
Consistent with this, it would seem that in most cases a government classification cannot
be challenged unless it is actually applied by an official to a litigant: The mere fact of its
existence is (rarely) enough.164
Moreover, the most forcefully tendered alternative justification for an anticlassification rule, which is framed in terms of its effects on citizens, rather than officials’
intentions, is not plausible. Speaking of the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Thomas has
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thus argued that “[t]he Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because
those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also
because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race
relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”165 (As an aside, note
that although this is victim-focused language, the italicized language is couched in terms
of intentionality—it does not train on the semantic quality of the relevant law or
regulation—even as the final clause is focused on the experience of those subject to
classifications).
Yet taken as a literal account of subjective experiences of those subject to
impermissible classifications, Justice Thomas’s assertion simply cannot be true. It is plain
even from a perusal of the U.S. Reports that members of the polity have widely divergent
responses to different government acts even when they do not implicate a suspect
classification.166 Not all members of the polity feel demeaned when a racial or religious
classification is deployed. Indeed, it is not even clear that those disadvantaged by the use
of such a criterion should feel slighted (as in the use of affirmative action, for example,
where other psychological reactions are both plausible and likely).167 As Lourey notes,
“the simple fact that a person classifies others (or herself for that matter) in terms of
‘race’ is in itself neither a good thing nor a bad thing.”168 The appeal of anticlassification
thus cannot turn on the subjective and perhaps idiosyncratic experiences of those who
perceive the government acting and thereby form judgments of their political standing.
Indeed, it is striking that many policies that are challenged under an anticlassification rule
do not use the prohibited criterion in a highly salient and public fashion. Paradoxically,
that criterion is salient only because of litigation challenging it.169 In practice, there is
something troublingly circular about building the constitutional case for anticlassification
on public perceptions which are themselves functions of constitutional litigation.
If subjective perceptions of legitimacy and worth are in practice differentially
affected by suspect classifications, it is hard to see why a categorical rule against them
could be warranted. The Court would have to make an empirical weighing of the positive
and negative reactions elicited by a government policy. Hence, when the Court in 2005
stated that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
165
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on the basis of race,” it has to be understood as making a normative rather than an
empirical claim.170 But the relevant decision contained no empirical evidence, and no
weighing of the costs of demoralization against the benefits of recognition. Hence, the
disparagement-centered explanation of the anticlassification rule is hard to sustain given
observed empirical facts.
Accordingly, the logic of anticlassification must reflect a victim-independent
judgment that there are normative grounds for objecting to the use of a specific criterion
in official decision-making regardless of the actual subjective experiences of those who
perceive the government action. The anticlassification concern, therefore, is better
understood as being triggered by the occurrence of an impermissible criterion in the
government’s decisional process whether overt or not. It is therefore best understood as
focusing on the cognitive content of governmental deliberation. In other words, it is as
much a matter of “discriminatory intent” as taste-based discrimination and statistical
discrimination.
Framed in these terms, the anticlassification rule might be better supported by the
argument that impermissible classifications embody or elicit objectionable forms of
official intentionality. Consistent with this intuition, some Justices have offered analogies
to Nazi race laws when discussing racial classifications. 171 These highly emotive
comparisons suggest that the Justices perceive some intrinsic, acontextual wrong in such
classifications that goes beyond the mere subjective perceptions of those regulated by the
law. Ascertaining whether this intuition is plausible is beyond my remit here, but it
cannot go without comment that equating a racial gerrymander designed to create
majority-minority districts in North Carolina to the 1935 Nuremberg race laws is hardly
self-evident—except, perhaps, as evidence of a want of good judgment.
Just as the boundaries of taste-based and statistical discrimination are fuzzy, so
too the plausible domain of the anticlassification rule is not as clear as might first appear.
Again, it is useful to consider the use of a formally permissible criterion that is
predictably likely to track the use of an impermissible criterion (e.g.. a claim that is made
about race in relation to criminality). If the use of the formally impermissible criterion is
so “demeaning”172 as to be beyond the constitutional pale, then it seems probable that a
close proxy for that impermissible classification would elicit at least some of the same
objections. For example, when the Court allows the loosening of Fourth Amendment
protections in “high crime neighborhood,” it is possible to discern an arguably
objectionable proxy for race at work.173 It is hard to see why this term should not also be
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condemned for the spillover stigmatic effect that results from its implicit invocation of
race—just as it is hard to see why reasons for prohibiting the use of impermissible
classifications as a proxy for licit ends do not spill over and apply to double-effect cases
such as Feeney.174 In this way, the logic of anticlassification is not easily confined as a
matter of logic to cases in which the impermissible criterion appears in the government’s
decisional process. Experience, of course, is another matter entirely.
D.

The Intent to Promote One’s Status by Denigrating Others: The Group
Status Production Theory of Discrimination

Neither taste-based discrimination nor statistical discrimination explain the
manifold ways in which impermissible criterion can be reflected in, and can motive, the
law. In the antebellum South, for example, races mixed physically because of the use of
house slaves and because of white (male) sexual predations against African-American
women. 175 Subsequently, neither laws barring miscegenation, not criminal statutes
imposing higher penalties on interracial rather than intraracial fornication, can be readily
explained by taste-based discrimination.176 Indeed, to the extent that discrimination is
modeled as an aversion to contact with another group, one might think that the law would
warrant greater penalties for intraracial fornication so as to engender effective deterrence.
A third theory of discriminatory intent seeks to explain state action that animated
not by disgust or by epistemic deficiency, but by the need to produce and reinforce status
hierarchies between different social groups. As refined by legal scholar Richard
McAdams, a theory of group status production understands discrimination as entailing
“processes by which one … group seeks to produce esteem for itself by lowering the
status of another group.”177 Esteem elicits more practical benefits such as the “set of
assumptions, privileges, and benefits that accompany” membership in the high status
group, and that constitute a valuable asset to be “affirmed, legitimated, and protected by
the law.” 178 On McAdams’s account of racial preferences, anti-discrimination law
respecting racial identity is hence justified because it “rais[es] the costs of subordination
… [to] induce people to switch to socially productive, or at least socially benign, means
of acquiring status.179
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The canon of First and Fourteenth Amendment law contains traces of concern
with group status production. Even if it is not at all clear that the model (theoretically
acute as it is) provides much guidance for formulating a doctrine of discriminatory intent,
it is not clear that the doctrine can ignore group status production. In the Equal Protection
context, there are a number of decisions that are hard to elucidate without it. For example,
in invalidating Virginia’s miscegenation statute, the Court relied not only on the fact that
the law contained an explicit racial classification, but also on the “fact that Virginia
prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons[, which] demonstrates that
the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to
maintain White Supremacy.” 180 A similar concern might be intimated in the
Establishment Clause jurisprudence of endorsement—a non-intent-based test—insofar as
it is concerned with the creation of “preferred,” and by implication disfavored, classes of
citizens.181
Despite these hints, the theory of group status production remains at the periphery
of constitutional antidiscrimination law. The rare instances in which the Court
understands a government action as part of a more general strategy of caste-making are
outliers, not path-marking harbingers of the jurisprudence’s future. A constitutional
jurisprudence of status production would require stable and reliable tools for picking out
measures intended to create hierarchical differences in status. As with the dynamic
accounts of statistical discrimination as a motor of social differentiation, it is not clear
that the group status production model can be squared with the limited transactional focus
of constitutional doctrine.
Perhaps the most plausible doctrinal entailment of the group status production can
be glimpsed in what Reva Siegel calls the “antibalkanization” theory of Equal Protection,
which “assesses the constitutionality of government action by asking about the kind of
polity it creates.”182 In particular, Siegel’s account of an anti-balkanization theme, largely
in recent opinions of Justice Kennedy, draws attention to the possibility that remedies for
racial injustice will themselves exacerbate intergroup resentment, and thereby entrench
corrosive divisions within society.183 In this fashion, it is conscious of competition for
status between social groups, although it is focused on consequences rather than
discriminatory intent, and hence does not fit into my typology here.
It is nevertheless noting that the normative appeal of antibalkization may well be
somewhat fragile as a model for judicial intervention. As Seigel notes, the logic of
antibalkanization can lead judges to curtail the state’s ability to remedy pervasive
socioeconomic disparities in ways that do more in practice to fracture society than
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remedies for racial injustice do.184 This would be an ironic consequence in the Equal
Protection Clause context, since the latter was crafted in response to deficient state
protection against social discrimination.185 Moreover, unlike economists working with
Lourey’s nuanced model of underinvestment in human capital, judges in constitutional
cases have only bare intuitions about when and how state action exacerbates racial
fragmentation. Given that the Justices tend to give only cursory and aphoristic
recognition of this causal inference problem, it seems quite unlikely that they will
accurately predict which instances of discrimination have pernicious self-confirming
effects in the long term.
E.

The Marginal Cases of Bad Intent: The Relation of Unconscious Bias and
Structural Discrimination to Discriminatory Intent

The two final, and most marginal, theories of discriminatory intent concern
unconscious bias and the neglect of structural forms of discrimination. To be very clear, I
do not think that either of these can be accounted a core case of impermissible
discriminatory intent. My reason for including them here is more subtle: Both, in my
view, are conceptually and practically congruent with core conceptions of discriminatory
intent. They are the ambiguous limit cases of discriminatory intent. Finally, both turn on
the risk that government decision-makers will take account of an impermissible ground of
decision even in the absence of an explicit instruction or desire to do so. Hence, I lump
them together here for convenience’s sake.
Consider first implicit bias. A large body of psychological studies suggests that, at
least with respect to race, “[i]mplicit biases[,] implicit attitudes and stereotypes … are
both pervasive (most individuals show evidence of some biases), and large in
magnitude.”186 Studies of implicit bias extend to high-salience situations where the use of
government authority is especially controversial. For example, psychological studies of
police use of firearms using simulated targets of different race suggest that unarmed
African-American targets are erroneously shot more often than unarmed white targets,
while armed white targets are mistakenly spared more often than armed AfricanAmerican targets.187 Studies of sentencing decisions find similar distortions.188
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Implicit bias is by definition not conscious—and hence is distinct from the other
strands of discriminatory intent canvassed above—but it is a function of cognitive
processes and categories that determine intentional actions. As such, it is not cleanly
distinct from other kinds of relevant intentionality. Moreover, taste-based discrimination
that is costly to express openly may be rearticulated as implicit appeals to the aversive
stereotypes—a sublimation of the core kind of discriminatory intent that is often
purposed as a conscious political strategy.189 To the extent that implicit bias becomes a
(sometimes conscious) substitute for overt taste-based discrimination in the political and
public sphere,190 there is an obvious case for considering its regulation under the rubric of
discriminatory intent.191
In contrast, structural discrimination concerns the “interplay between individuals
and the[ir] larger organizational environments.”192 In its most common articulation, it is
used to characterize the role of race in American society (although its terms are readily
transposed to gender, sexuality, or ethnicity). Its principal theorists seek to describe and
critique a “racialized social system” in which “political, social, and ideological levels are
partially structured by the placement of actors in racial categories or races.” 193
Importantly, those theorists point out that social action within such a system cannot be
easily characterized as discriminatory vel non: When the regulatory principles of social
status, and hence the governmental systems for allocating benefits or burdens on the basis
of status or dessert, presuppositions that in insolation would be quickly labeled
discriminatory are so pervasively and subtly brocaded though the frames of social action
that they cannot be avoided without conscious effort.194 To show an improper bias, on
this view, is to proceed without accounting for the ways in which a classification already
organizes access to social, financial, and political resources. Intentions are thus
189
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understood not only in terms of means and ends, but also in terms of omissions and
suppressions.
Judicial doctrine under the First and the Fourteenth Amendment largely ignores
implicit bias and structural exclusion.195 It also implicitly rejects their premises. Doctrine
in both domains is neutral in respect to the specific ascriptive identity in play. Formally at
least, the doctrine is supposed to be applied even-handedly whether the complaining
litigant is Christian or Muslim, white or African-American.196 Yet the thrust of both of
both implicit bias and structural exclusion theories is that surface neutrality should not be
mistaken for practically equal treatment. Each theory, albeit in different ways, posits
dynamic forces (psychological or social) that render formally neutral legal arrangements
functionally inegalitarian. By resisting any asymmetries in the treatment of protected
groups, however, constitutional doctrine thus sets its face against acknowledgement of
both theories.
Yet it is far from clear that the theories of discriminatory bias that underlying the
doctrinal fabric support this exclusion. Taste-based discrimination posits quite simply
that a person “dislikes members of a minority group and does not want to associate with
them.”197 Becker’s model of labor markets characterized by taste-based discrimination,
like most rational choice models, focuses on how preferences are expressed through
market interactions. The model does not require discriminatory intent to be articulated, or
even acknowledged. It seems both possible and probably that the same preferences can be
conveyed in coded, yet effective, ways. Hence, there is no theoretical reason to exclude
implicit bias from a doctrine of discriminatory intent modeled on taste-based
discrimination. And there is no dispute that discriminatory intent, for constitutional
purposes, encompasses taste-based discrimination.
Similarly, there is no a priori reason for a doctrinal scheme crafted around
statistical discrimination to exclude cases in which implicit bias has a dispositive causal
effect. For example, there is powerful evidence from audit studies of private hiring
decisions that employers use race as a proxy for criminality notwithstanding the
availability of other information about skills and employment history.198 Similar studies
find that apparently gay applicants are treated differently than equally qualified
heterosexual men at the threshold hiring stage, especially when employers seek
“stereotypically male heterosexual traits.” 199 Yet these effects from statistical
195
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discrimination—in which negative inferences are drawn in respect to expected job
performance from the possession of static, non-performative traits—do not in any way
depend upon employer awareness of their stereotypical cognitive process. To the
contrary, it seems as plausible to posit that employers who do not recognize the
stereotypical bases for their decisional process will fall back unconsciously on well-worn
templates of social action in making decisions. To the extent that statistical
discrimination motivates the constitutional doctrine of discriminatory intent, therefore,
there is no reason why notions of implicit bias should be excluded.
In short, the doctrinal boundary between conscious forms of discriminatory intent
and unreflective forms—especially when a function of unconscious processes—cannot be
derived from underlying theories of discriminatory intent. It is rather the Court that is
responsible for gerrymandering the operative doctrinal conception of bias to carve out
these consequential theories of discrimination in ways that want for theoretical
justification.
F.

Accounting for the Diversity of Discriminatory Intents

“Discriminatory intent”—which is a key organizing term in Equal Protection and
Religion Clause—is not a single concept. Rather, by drawing on economic, sociological,
and psychological studies, this Part has illuminated the plural conceptions of bias
simultaneously at work in current doctrine. These conceptions of bias operate at
complements in (or at the margins of) current doctrinal arrangements, rather than
substitutes: Different judicial applications of the Constitution’s protections for vulnerable
social groups alternatively invoke taste-based discrimination when invalidating municipal
restrictions on Santeria, notions of statistical discrimination when policing political
redistricting, an anticlassification logic when constraining affirmative action programs,
and a grasp of group-status production dynamics when invalidating interracial marriage
prohibitions.
One further reason for this heterogeneity is historical. Specific cases and accounts
of the courts’ role in American history play anchoring roles in judicial reasoning.200
Definitional heterogeneity cannot be avoided without abandoning canonical precedent
and stories within the historical canon of antidiscrimination. The repudiation of explicit
racial segregation in the Jim Crow South, establishment of a single church, bars on
interracial marriage are all parts of our constitutional canon. In each case, it is plausible
to see different species of discriminatory intent at work—including, taste-based
discrimination, group status production, and anticlassification. The Court’s jurisprudence
is necessarily oriented by the concerns raised by these cases. Although the argument from
canonical precedent explains why the Court is unlikely to pick only one of the variations
of discriminatory intent identified in Part II, it does not illuminate the manner in which
choices between those species of intent are made in specific cases.
200
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Doctrine heterogeneity resulting from the plural ways in which intent can figure
in government decision-making and historical precedent is not intrinsically problematic
(although its exclusion of unconscious bias lacks adequate justification). But it would be
better of the diversity of discriminatory intents were acknowledged. Familiar debates
about the permissibility of affirmative action, about when differential regulatory
treatment of religion implicates a constitutional concept, and about the legality of
seemingly even handed prohibitions on interracial and same-sex marriage and
intercourse—all these in part hinge on the question of which conception of discriminatory
intent should be prioritized. This question would be better confronted head on, rather than
in the Court’s current crab-wise fashion.
At present, moreover, judges have discretion not only to move between different
conception of discriminatory intent, but also contract or expand those conceptions across
different cases because their boundaries are ambiguous and contestable—a discretion that
is rarely recognized and now operates without meaningful discipline, a discretion to
which I now turn.
III.

The Discovery of Discriminatory Intent

This Part analyzes a second aspect of the judicial treatment of discriminatory
intent. Focusing on decisions of the Supreme Court, I explore the implications of the
straightforward fact that there exists a wide array of instruments for investigating
allegations of discriminatory intent. My analysis here is organized around a taxonomy of
the evidentiary tools employed to identify when discriminatory intent has played a role in
government decision-making. These include the semantic context of an official directive
(such as a law or executive order); the statements of officials; the context in which a
policy was enacted, or its consequences once enacted; the results of depositions or
interrogatories as elements of a pretrial discovery process; and statistical evidence
derived from econometric analysis of the government’s action. It is a striking feature of
the cases that the permissibility and value of these materials is not framed as a matter of
evidence law generally or the Federal Rules of Evidence in particular. To the contrary,
the evidentiary weighing discussed in this Part exists at an angle to the latter body of law.
As a result, my analysis trains on the discriminatory intent case-law narrowly, without
trying to account for larger evidence-law questions.
The Supreme Court initially signaled its willingness to entertain a wide range of
evidentiary strategies for identifying improper intent. In Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, the Court recognized that the judicial
task of discovering “whether invidious intent was a motivating factor demands a sensitive
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.”201
While Arlington Heights has come to be known largely for its “motivating factor”
holding (and its concomitant rejection of the idea that bias must be the sole or
“dominant” factor202), its approach to evidence may well be as or more consequential.
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The Court in that case canvassed a wide range of evidence, including disparate impact,
“historical background,” including deviations from normal government procedure,
“contemporaneous statements” by officials, and in “some extraordinary instances” trial
testimony of decision-makers under oath.203 A similar approach is apparent in a roughly
contemporaneous Establishment Clause case in which the Court was willing to take
judicial notice of facts—such as Kentucky’s “plainly religious” motive for posting the
Decalogue in all classrooms—evident from social context but hard to prove by traditional
means.204
But this capacious and catholic approach to the discovery of discriminatory intent
is honored more in the breach than in the observance. In practice, even though Arlington
Height remains formally ‘good’ law, the Court evinces an erratic and uneven response to
various kinds of evidence. In respect to each species of such evidence, it is possible to
identify instances in which the Court has been permissive, and other instances in which it
categorically rejects the same kind of evidence. Denying litigants license to introduce a
species of evidence, the Court typically appeals to the costs of such permissions. But its
cost estimates are persistently based on fragile speculation, fail to account for alternative
ways of dealing with the costs, and remain blind to interactions with other prohibitions on
admissibility. Perhaps the most acute example of such an interaction emerges in the
criminal procedure domain, where the Court has separately, and without any crossreference, resisted the two most important instruments for discovering illicit intent—the
ordinary tools of discovery, and the empirical study of overall patterns of state behavior.
In working through the five species of evidence generally available to show
discriminatory intent, I emphasize two points. First, I draw attention to the contrary
treatment of the same kind of evidence in distinct cases. Second, I challenge the reasons
given for intermittently excluding or disregarding evidence of improper motive,
suggesting that Court has either exaggerated the costs of allowing evidence to be
considered, or minimized the benefits from doing so. Working in tandem, these lines of
arguments provide support for my ultimate argument in favor of a return to the more
generous Arlington Heights approach in the next Part—an approach that does not rig
doctrine to favor some claims of discriminatory intent over others.
A.

The Semantic Content of Laws and Regulations

The semantic content (or linguistic meaning)205 of government action that is
reduced to writing as a law or regulation (or as the transcript of an oral intercession by an
official) seems an obvious and uncontroversial place to start the search for discriminatory
intent. The logic of anticlassification, in particular, places great emphasis on semantic
content, whereas the animus and group status production theories treat it as less central.
203

Id. at 266-68.
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam). Other Establishment Clauses employed a
similarly latitudinarian approach to discovery. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 57 (1985) (relying
on a range of testimonial and other sources to hold that Alabama’s moment of silence statute was motivated
by a desire to promote religion).
205
Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 98 (2010)
(“The semantic content of a legal text is simply the linguistic meaning of the text.”).
204

41

Perhaps as a consequence, there are relatively few formal legal measures today that
explicitly incorporate a suspect classification. Race is explicitly mentioned now in
remedial measures employed in the secondary and tertiary education contexts designed to
respond to the continued absence of African-Americans and other minorities.206 Religion
is mentioned when a state, moved by Establishment Clause concerns, moves to bar
religious groups’ access state funds or public forums.207 Neither kind of measure fares
well in court these days, reflecting the increasing vulnerability of explicit usages of
formal categories.
In some instances, moreover, courts have evinced careful sensitivity to textual
clues that an impermissible classification provides a structuring principle from the law.
For instance, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court
invalidated a Floridian municipal ordinance that was “gerrymander[ed] to prohibit
Santeria ceremonies while permitting many other kinds of animal killing to proceed.208
But in addition to looking at the irregular pattern of exceptions and inclusions, the Court
also flagged the specific vocabulary used in the measure—such as the words the “use of
the words ‘sacrifice’ and ‘ritual’”—as evidence that a discomfort with religion motivated
the law.209 Words matters not only for their narrow dictionary-defined content, but also
for their unspoken but readily available connotations.
A similar linguistic trace is found in the March 2017 travel ban promulgated by
President Trump 210 Like its precursor, that order contains a peculiar and otherwise
inexplicable reference to “honor killing.”211 That term is commonly used solely to apply
to Islamic contexts, notwithstanding the tragic pervasiveness of intrafamilial violence
against women in many cultures, as a means to pejoratively taint Muslims as a group as
intrinsically violent.212 A case in which a protected class is not mentioned by name, but
by a terminological proxy that is easily discerned by the public—in effect, a rhetorical
“dog whistle” that seeks to invoke a negative stereotype about a suspect
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classification213—should by logic be treated no differently from an instance in which the
verbal specification of the targeted group is incrementally less occluded.
But it would be a mistake to think that the infusion of formal legal text or
instruction with an impermissible classification will always be grounds for quick
invalidation. A surprisingly large number of common government practices turn on a
suspect classification’s deployment—and yet have remained beyond judicial purview.
For example, I have already observed that even though race is a common trait employed
in police suspect descriptions used by local, state, and federal law enforcement, federal
courts have not expended significant effort in considering their constitutionality. 214
Challenges to race-specific suspect selection are routinely turned aside by the federal
courts.215 Similarly, the family law domain is characterized by “racial permissiveness”
with officials routinely employing race to make decisions with large and immediate
repercussions for particular individuals.216 No explanation is tendered by judges for these
exceptions. There is also no reason such gaps in judicial scrutiny cannot expand in the
future.
Nevertheless, semantic content of law remains central in most other contexts. As a
result, restrictions upon other mechanisms for proving discriminatory intent tend to make
the semantic context of a law more important. Anticlassification theories fit most
comfortably on a foundation of sematic meaning (and nothing else). Hence, isolating
semantic meaning as the sole or preferred evidence of discriminatory intent is a way of
collapsing the definition of discriminatory intent to train solely upon anticlassification.217
In this fashion, it is possible to recalibrate constitutional prohibitions without changing
substantive constitutional doctrine.
B.

Official Statements

It sometimes happens that an official responsible for a state action makes a
statement to another person that provides prima facie evidence of an improper intent. It
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might seem that such a “statement against interest”218 would be especially probative of
the existence of one or other form of discriminatory intent, especially where animus and
group status production are suspected. 219 Indeed, such statements often figure
prominently in constitutional discrimination cases. For example, in the 2017 North
Carolina racial gerrymandering case discussed in the Introduction, the Court identified
statements made by legislators responsible for mapmaking on the state senate floor that
they felt they “must include a sufficient number of African-Americans” in the challenged
district.220 The Court further relied on trial testimony from another state legislator to the
effect that mapmakers had expressed the same racial aim to him.221
Similarly, in ascertaining the “purpose” of the Defense of Marriage Act in
Windsor, the Court looked to a House Report that pointed to “traditional (especially
Judeo–Christian) morality” as a basis for the measure.222 In evaluating Alabama’s statute
authorizing a daily moment of silence in schools, the Court also looked to the statements
of the measure’s sponsors, and took account of his confirmatory statements before the
district court.223 And in the recent challenge to juror discrimination under the Sixth
Amendment, the Court declined to treat the jury as a sealed black box even after evidence
of improper motive had emerged.224 Finally, such statements remain one of the few
means of proving up the presence of bias in the criminal justice system more generally.225
Nevertheless, there are ways to deflect the evidentiary force of statements that are
on their face probative of unconstitutional intent. The Court can carve out categories of
constitutional challenges to be resolved without regard to such evidence, even when
obvious and powerful proof of bias. By crafting exceptions strategically, the Court can
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render irrelevant otherwise probative materials in circumstances where other forms of
evidence may be unlikely to emerge.226
An instructive example arises in the Establishment Clause context of challenges
to features of the physical landscape created by the state with an explicitly religious
message. Ordinarily, both the religious and the sectarian content of such measures is
evident (quite literally) on the face of such monuments. Because their sponsors have no
wish to shy away from religious and even sectarian endorsement, moreover, statements
against constitutional interest are not uncommon. A plurality of the Court in a 2005 case
concerning a stone inscription of the Decalogue on the grounds of the Texas State
Capital, however, suggested that the purpose test employed in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence was “not useful,” and instead looked at “the nature of the monument and
… our Nation’s history.”227
But why? The plurality opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist did not explain why
the concept of purpose—which, as we have seen, is employed across a wide range of
other doctrinal and institutional contexts—was inapposite in respect to monuments.
Indeed, given that such monuments are typically created at a specific moment after a
specific sequence of state actions and deliberations, they present straightforward cases for
purpose analysis. By contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s substitute analytic frame is
notable largely because it is inherently ambiguous (what constitutes the “nature” of a
monument?) and its open-endedness (what parts of “our Nation’s history” are relevant?
Should it include the persistent of religious minorities, such as Catholics, Mormons, and
Jehovah’s Witnesses, for example?). 228 Where the Court offers an exception to the
purpose rule for cases in which probative evidence is likely to be easily and readily
available—and fails to offer persuasive (or, indeed, any) reasons for its abrogation—
concern must arise about the deployment of shifting evidentiary rules to achieve
substantive ends that the Court has not explicated or justified. It is a sub rosa way of
expunging all forms of intent-focused analysis canvassed in Part II—including
anticlassification analysis—from the constitutional lexicon.
Another argument for resisting judicial consideration of facially compromising
statements focuses on the incentive effects of such a rule. In the juror bias case discussed
above, Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion thus celebrated the jury’s ability “to speak,
debate, argue, and make decisions the way ordinary people do in their daily lives.”229 In
the challenge to the travel ban case, the government has argued in parallel terms that
campaign statements should not be admissible evidence of impermissible bias on the part
226
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of an elected official lest democratic debate be chilled. 230 But such incentive-based
arguments are at best speculative and at worst specious.
Consider again the jury case. Justice Alito’s key theoretical premise is that juries
should work as miniature versions of the democratic polity. This is a claim that is flawed
as a matter of history and practice.231 The “aim of a jury is “explicitly epistemic,” not
representational.232 Jury deliberations are not “ordinary” speech familiar from “daily
lives.” Rather, they arise a legally structured environment in which lay judgments are
exhorted on specific questions of law and fact.233 The existence of a pervasive bias
against a certain group in “ordinary” society does not legitimate the recapitulation of that
bias in jury deliberations. To the contrary, norms against the expression of irrelevant and
distortionary tropes that characterize demotic speech promote the jury’s specialized
function.234 Similarly, a powerful critique could be mounted against the Government’s
argument in the travel ban case respecting the admission of campaign speech. To begin
with, candidates seeking to play on discriminatory sentiments among the public are
unlikely to be chilled by the prospect of litigation (which might simply allow them to
amplify their rhetoric and include federal judges among their targets). Where pre-election
rhetoric tracks post-election action, moreover, there are good Bayesian grounds for
concluding that the earlier rhetoric was not mere puffery. Finally, it is passing odd to
reject evidence on the ground that candidates should not be understood to mean what they
say prior to an election: It might instead be more compatible with the democratic
commitments of the Constitution to make precisely the opposite assumption as a way of
taking seriously the electoral structures created in Articles I and II.235 Those who urge the
disregard of campaign statements implicit treat the democratic process little more than a
cheap vaudeville—bright lights, thickly caked make-up, and nought of enduring
substance.
More generally, it is hard to conceive of reasons to ignore statements—already
made and available as proof—when their content provides prima facie evidence of
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improper intent. The exceptions to this rule, whether in the doctrine or offered in current
cases, are unpersuasive and should be abandoned.
C.

Circumstantial Evidence: History and Consequences

Discriminatory intent can often be inferred from circumstantial evidence that
takes a variety of forms. The Court in Arlington Heights, for example, identified the
“specific sequence of events” preceding the challenged decision, “[d]epartures from the
normal procedural sequence,” and a more general category of “legislative and
administrative history.”236 A similar procedure was said to govern Establishment Clause
challenges, which are evaluated within the “history of the government's actions.”237
Arlington Height’s list can be supplemented. A somewhat trivial example
concerns the physical setting of a measure challenged on Establishment Clause
grounds. 238 But more substantial and generalizable examples exist. For instance, a
mismatch between expected consequences and legitimate policy justifications can
undermine the assumption that the latter motivated a law. In Romer v. Evans, for
example, the Court concluded that Colorado’s Amendment 2, which prohibited most
legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect gays homosexual persons
from discrimination, “raise[d] the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.”239 The outcome of Romer did not
depend on a direct evaluation of the voting public’s intent. Instead, it was justified by the
Court’s observation that Amendment 2 was “so discontinuous with the reasons offered
for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it
affects.”240 Romer hence rested on an inference from the means-ends rationality of a
single policy measure—an index of bias typically unavailable when the object of the
popular franchise is a person or a political party that represents a cluster of policies and
values.
Context and consequences are likely to be of greatest salience when animus,
statistical discrimination, or group status production are issue. They will matter relatively
little in anticlassification challenges. The doctrinal instruments for occluding context
236
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from judicial consideration hence are ways of raising the salience of anticlassification,
while relegating the role of animus and remaining theories of discriminatory intent.
Perhaps the most important doctrinal impediment to the serious consideration of
context is the idea of deference to an expert official. Judges vary, however, in their
willing to exercise such deference across different contexts. The willingness to look
beyond the reasons supplied for an official decision seemingly fluctuates in accord with
judges’ priors about a given class of officials. The problem is not the preserve of one or
the other ideological wing of the federal courts. On the one hand, liberal judges have
evinced deference to university administrators’ use of classifications and rules that raise
concerns about the role of both race and religion. Endorsing a state university’s
imposition of a nondiscrimination requirement on all student groups that sought funding
from the public fisc, for instance, a liberal majority of the Supreme Court underscored its
“appropriate regard for school administrators’ judgments” in determining how best to
promote educational goals.241 In dissent, Justice Alito highlighted facts tending to suggest
that administrators had been hostile to the plaintiff student groups based on their religious
nature.242 By contrast, Justice Alito (as well as Justice Thomas), viewed the Trump travel
ban through a lens of deference akin to the one they had criticized only a few years
before.243 It might be anticipated that liberal Justices, like judges in the circuit courts,
would take a different view.
The question of deference to officials on the basis of expertise and political
accountability is a large one, which has spawned enormous literatures.244 But the question
raised by these cases is in fact quite narrow—and rather easy to answer. When a judge
must ascertain whether an agency official has acted on the basis of an unconstitutional
motive, the standard arguments for deference from expertise and from political
accountability are not relevant. The policy expertise of, say, university administrators in
the University of California system or career staffs in the National Security Council are
independent of whether they acted with a discriminatory intent. There is no logical
relation between expertise and a fair disposition toward vulnerable social groups. Nor
does democratic accountability give any reason to defer to an official’s factual claim that
she acted on the basis of proper motives rather than unlawful bias.245 At best, expertise
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may be relevant if a defendant official points to evidence that she in fact relied on her
bespoke knowledge and skills in riposte to a bias allegation. But in evaluating the factual
question whether a plaintiff’s allegation, or this response, is more a more persuasive
account of historical events, there is no reason to favor a priori one side in that dispute.
More generally, there is a long-standing consensus among scholars that even
expert administrative agencies have no special competence as to the specification
constitutional law.246 It follows from this position a fortiori that official should obtain no
particular deference when it comes to factual findings that are necessary predicates to the
application of a constitutional antidiscrimination rule.247 To grant such deference would,
in general, mean the creation of a special dispensation to violate constitutional rules when
their application turned on questions of disputable fact.248
Once again, the reasons for categorically excluding or ignoring the evidence of
discriminatory intent that is available in context and consequences—wholly prior to
litigation—are at best fragile. Once again, it seems there is little reason to carve out
distinct exceptions to how plaintiffs can go about proving an unlawfully discriminatory
intent, especially when doing so disadvantages plaintiffs suffering under the various
forms of discriminatory intent to varying extents.
D.

The Mechanisms of Civil Discovery

Of course, in many cases, no smoking gun statement by an official will be
available.249 And often, the circumstances and consequences of policy-making will be
empirically murky, their interpretation amenable to sharply conflicting takes. The
consequences of statistical discrimination, in particular, will be often observationally
equivalent to reliance on a permissible trait. Hence, no clear inference of improper
motive may be discerned from semantic content, context, or immediate consequences. As
a result, the ordinary mechanisms of civil discovery such as interrogatories, depositions,
and document production, may be especially important in substantiating the presence of
91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1296 (1982) (describing groups that need constitutional protection because they are
“perpetual losers of the political arena”).
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discriminatory intent that takes the form of animus, group status production, or statistical
discrimination.250
From the beginning of intent-focused antidiscrimination jurisprudence, however,
courts have been preternaturally cautious about civil discovery against the government.
The Arlington Heights Court, for example, described the use of trial testimony (although
not discovery) as “extraordinary.”251 Since then, the Supreme Court and lower courts
have evinced increasing hostility to statutory discrimination cases more generally.252
Perhaps with those cases in mind, the Justices have pressed a series of procedural
changes, including to the well-pleaded complaint rule and the summary judgment regime,
of late. These have had “a disparate impact on employment discrimination and civil rights
cases” against both private and state actors insofar as the latter tend to be more dependent
on pretrial discovery than other species of cases.253
Nevertheless, civil discovery and trial testimony remain important pathways to
evidence about discriminatory intent, and have yielded instrumental evidence in a number
of cases. For example, in a legal challenge to Alabama’s 2012 redistricting of its House
and Senate seats, the Court looked to evidence from a sequence of depositions, “to show
that the legislature had deliberately moved black voters into … majority-minority
districts.”254 The dissent did not object to the legality of such depositions, but instead
argued that more effective use of “discovery and trial” would be necessary to
demonstrate that specific districts had been improperly drawn.255
By contrast, discovery is generally not available when the Court deems it likely to
be costly or to infringe on the prerogatives of the executive branch. This perception has
been most acute when the state acts coercively against specific individuals—a context in
which animus and statistical discrimination are more likely to be present than group
status production or anticlassification concerns. In a series of cases cross-cutting the
criminal law and immigration law field—i.e.. the modal forms of individuated coercive
state action today—the Court has imposed functionally insurmountable barriers to
discovery. For example, in the context of racially selective prosecution claims, the Court
in United States v. Armstrong prohibited discovery unless a defendant can produce “some
evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but
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were not.”256 Of course, since such defendants by stipulation were not prosecuted in
federal court (and were unlikely to have been charged in state court), it will rarely be the
case that documentary evidence of their existence will be available.257 In the immigration
removal context, the Court has simply ruled out selective enforcement claims about
“outrageous” discrimination. 258 In the visa-issuance context (where the relevant state
actor is typically a consular official located extraterritorially), it has deferred to the
“facially legitimate and bona fida” decisions of consular officials.259
These deference doctrines, which regulate both access to pretrial discovery and
access to trial, are justified first in terms of the deadweight costs of selective prosecution
claims,260 and second in terms of a constitutional concern about judicial interference with
“a core executive constitutional function.”261
But both of those justifications for constrained discovery are far weaker than first
appears. To begin with, it is worth underscoring that there is no doubt that constitutional
antidiscrimination rules constrain prosecutorial discretion.262 Rather, it is not at all clear
that permitting more extensive discovery has the costs that the Armstrong Court
intimates. Although not an exact parallel, states’ experiences with so-called “open file”
policies are instructive. Several states have adopted various iterations of an open-file
policy, by which defendants have broad access to materials in a prosecutor’s files.263
These policies, however, have no led to dramatic chances in clearance rates or case
processing, perhaps because public defenders’ resources tend to be sufficiently
constrained so as to preclude their aggressive exploitation of open file policies.264 That is,
allowing discovery by default does not impose deadweight costs that reduce the rate of
prosecutions. State-level experience with open file, therefore, undermines the Court’s
concern with the disruptive effect of increasing discovery of prosecutorial motivations.
Compounding the minimal effect of greater discovery, it seems quite likely that judges
would be reluctant to impose “extreme” sanctions such as the dismissal of charges if and
256
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when evidence of bias surfaces.265 Hence, it far from clear that more discovery would
change the outcome of specific cases (even if it changes the mix of cases filed). Given
that concerns about prosecutorial discretion are often taken as the paradigmatic case
justifying limited discovery, it is reasonable to worry that more peripheral cases will
involve even weaker governmental anti-disclosure justifications.
Moreover, it is striking that the Court has cracked open, if only slightly, the jury
room to allow inquiry into discriminatory intent, while keeping prosecutorial discretion
shrouded from view. Juries have long been a vanishingly small part of the criminal
justice system. In contrast, prosecutors exercise vast authority as a result of their charging
and plea bargaining authority on criminal justice matters.266 Prosecutorial decisions are
also “important” sources of racial disparities, especially decisions about mandatory
minimums.267 To the extent that public confidence in the criminal justice system is a
function of the actual influence of race-based decision-making, current doctrine thus
seems to have its priorities backward. Allowing greater discovery of prosecutors’ intent
may deter what appears to be a significant effect of unconstitutional bias. It would also
eliminate any marginal incentive for a prosecutor to use a plea bargain rather than trial
given the knowledge that jurors’ racial biases may be more readily exposed than
prosecutors’.
E.

Statistical Evidence

The final kind of evidence that can be deployed to demonstrate unconstitutional
discrimination is the output of econometric models that estimate either the causal effect
of a suspect classification on government action, or alternatively identify correlations
between the distribution of that classification and the state’s imposition of costs on the
public. Evidence of this sort is most useful to uncover animus and unconscious bias, but
it can also be used to root out the use of impermissible criteria as proxies for other goals.
By contrast, it is not needful in anticlassification challenges.
Judicial attitudes to statistical evidence of race discrimination have been
inconsistent at best. On the one hand, such evidence is embraced in the context of
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gerrymandering cases, where the correlations between districting on the one hand and
race, partisanship, and other relevant factors can be teased out with precision.268 On the
other hand, the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp rejected the use of system-wide evidence of
racial disparities to demonstrate discriminatory intent on the part of a specific jury.269
While McCleskey focused on the inference of intent from system-level characteristics—
i.e., the role of race in the Georgia capital punishment system as a whole—to a specific
criminal proceedings, lower courts have extended its holding to the quite different
context of statistical evidence about the role of race in a single decision-maker’s actions
over time (e.g., a single district attorney over a number of years). 270 By contrast,
challenges to policing policies, such as stop and frisk, have at times turned in part on
statistical evidence that the distribution of police actions cannot be explained by the
historical distribution of crimes, but can be closely correlated to racial demographics.271
Judicial skepticism of econometric evidence of impermissible motives is
unwarranted and unwise. To begin with, the McCleskey Court criticized the study of the
Georgia capital system presented in that case because it did not “prove that race enters
into any capital sentencing proceeding,” but only “show[s] a likelihood” of this
impermissible result.272 This is true, but also irrelevant. Most sophisticated econometric
analysis of a complex phenomenon characterized by multiple potential causal predicates
will entail several model specifications, each of which assumes a different set of
structural relationships between tested variables. The coefficients derived from such
models—say, of race effects—are not an unmediated measure of causal or correlational
effects, but require interpretation.273 What the McCleskey Court took to be a criticism is
thus a persistent quality of econometric evidence: It always and only “show[s] a
likelihood” of bias.274 It is not “proof” in the same form as an inculpatory oral statement.
But this is all the more reason not to dismiss it categorically. It is precisely because
statistical evidence is almost never determinative on its own, but rather grist to a process
of Bayesian inference that accounts for other factors, that its admission is not as
disruptive and destabilizing as the McClesky Court feared (or, as catalytic as its
proponents might hope).
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A more promising approach to statistical evidence in the criminal justice context
is reflected in a 1977 case in which the Court found proof of substantial deviations
between a racial group's representation on juries and its presence in the population at
large. This evidence, in conjunction with a jury selection system susceptible to abuse,
was identified as a prima facie equal protection violation.275 That is, econometric results
provide a basis for inference—not proof per se—much like most other sorts of evidence.
In that spirit, the judge tasked with investigating discriminatory intent should embrace
statistical findings for their modest, but important role of evidentiary support.276 Their
near-categorical exclusion in the criminal justice context since McClesky is especially
unfortunate since that context is one in which animus and statistical discrimination are
likely to figure in troubling ways that can best be flushed out using econometric tools.
F.

The State of (Evidentiary) Play

Scholars have to date paid little attention to the evolving strategies of proof
available to litigants alleging discriminatory intent under the Constitution. But this has
been a domain of dramatic and consequential change. This Part has demonstrated that
granular shifts in these evidentiary doctrines can and do drive change over the forms and
loci of justiciable discrimination, even as the Court makes no formal change to the
substantive law of Equal Protection and the Religion Clauses. The contrast with older
doctrine is striking: Upon its installation of intent as the axiomatic term in the
Constitution’s protection of vulnerable social minorities, the Court embraced a broad and
varied range of evidentiary tools. This appropriately flexible approach has largely
vanished in favor of a more erratic and haphazard.
The Court has offered a range of justifications for refusing to attend to officials’
public statements, declining to account for statistical evidence, and ignoring context and
history. But these justifications have consistently been flawed. The case for categorical
exclusions from the evidentiary toolkit for proving discriminatory intent, therefore, is
weak even if one limits the analysis to the considerations proffered by the Justices
themselves.
IV.

Reconstructing the Judicial Treatment of Discriminatory Intent

This Part develops two external critiques of current arrangements for discovering
discriminatory intent based on its distributional and epistemic effects. It then articulates
the basic elements of an even-handed doctrinal framework that accounts for the full range
of conceptions of discriminatory intent but does not implicitly tilt the playing field away
from a subset of meritorious discrimination claims. My aim here, to be clear, is not to
recapitulate the hoary contest between anticlassificatory and alternate concepts of
discriminatory intent. Rather, it is to demonstrate that a manageable, principled, and
transparent doctrinal structure for evaluating both these and other kinds of discrimination
275
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claims is within reach. It should be employed in lieu of current arrangements for
discovering discriminatory intent—even as disagreement persists about which conception
of discriminatory intent to prioritize.
A.

The Substantive Effects of Evolving Rules for Discovering Bias

A threshold consequence of changes to the evidentiary approaches to
discriminatory intent has been to make certain conceptions of intent increasingly immune
from constitutional scrutiny. By opening, closing, or narrowing different evidentiary
pathways by which a party asserting a constitutional right might demonstrate an improper
motivation, the judiciary nudges the burden of constitutional constraint from one
institution to another.
Consider an example of the way in which the doctrine pushes judicial scrutiny
between different loci of potential discrimination: Large institutions such as schools and
universities necessarily operate through the internal promulgation of written regulations
and guidance to discrete officials. Their reliance on such guidance—say, when
determining admissions or regulating student groups—means they necessarily depend on
written commands between hierarchically situated officials. The semantic context of such
commands is almost always going to be available as evidence in discriminatory intent
cases, and now will almost always be amenable to discovery.
By contrast, in the criminal justice context, smaller prosecution offices may not
need to formalize orders in writing. And if impermissible criteria are invoked in internal
documents, it is unlikely that these will be flushed out through litigation after Armstrong.
Moreover, judicial skepticism about statistical evidence bars the indirect demonstration
of impermissible considerations in prosecutorial decisions. Hence, although McCleskey
and Armstrong do not cite each other, they have an important interaction insofar as they
simultaneously block the two most important pathways to proving up impermissible
intent in the criminal justice context.
This means that it is harder (all else being equal) to discriminate in the school
than in the prison or the prosecutor’s office. But why should this be so? It is hard to see
how this differential can be justified, especially given what is know about the extent of
bias in the criminal justice system.277
More broadly, with one exception, the doctrine’s prioritization of evidence of
semantic content over circumstantial, statistical, or testimonial evidence acts as a subsidy
for anticlassification claims in relation to claims based on alternate conceptions of
discriminatory intent.278 The exception is that anticlassification loses its reforming force
in the criminal law context. This is because the Court has been unwilling to rule on the
constitutionality of race-based decision even when they shade into the use of race as a
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general proxy for criminal suspicion.279 On the other side of the ledger, most other claims
of discriminatory intent are set up to fail given the lack of relevant evidentiary tools—
with one exception again: This is where a potentially discriminatory animus or statistical
discrimination is the work of an institutional body, and can be challenged through post
hoc civil litigation—think of the affirmative action or the racial gerrymandering cases—
the Court has been willing to entertain wide-ranging civil discovery to explore how and
when impermissible classifications have come into play.
Three more general points emerge from this bird’s eye view. First, the net result
of these doctrinal trends is that legislative bodies are more likely to see their work closely
scrutinized for bias than executive branch actors. Second, where discretionary policy
decisions are not executed through written instructions, but instead via case-by-case
determinations (as is the case with prosecutors often and police almost always), it will be
harder to prove a discriminatory intent. Third, it is easier to challenge a non-coercive than
a coercive policy (i.e., one in the criminal, national security or immigration contexts),
even though the latter entail more immediate and harmful invasions of bodily integrity
and liberty. Hence, as the context of a discriminatory intent challenge moves from
legislative handling of a regulatory issue to the exercise of dispersed executive discretion
over state coercion—antidiscrimination norms lose their force. In part, this means not
only that anticlassification norms are more likely to be enforced than other conceptions of
discriminatory intent. It also means that the animus and statistical discrimination
conceptions are unevenly and somewhat erratically implemented. Hence, what Ian
Haney-López condemns as binary “intentional blindness” to bias against minorities based
on deliberate refusal to look inside the “minds of government officials,” may be better
understood as the results of uneven calibration of different evidentiary implements.280
This doctrinal arrangement has two troubling implications. First, it will lead
judges to recognize some forms of intent, but not others, as a predicate to their
remediation. It hence creates winners and losers among those subject to unconstitutional
discrimination. The winners will tend to be social majorities. For the modal form of raceconscious decision-making that is easiest to challenge under this evidentiary dispensation
is the codified affirmative action programs that promotes the interests of minorities.
Establishments that reflect an explicit preference for religious majorities, moreover, will
often be insulated from review by a doctrinal lens that focuses on tradition rather than
sematic content.281
In contrast, the species of discrimination that matter most to racial and religious
minorities—in particular, the improper use of discretion by police, prosecutors, and
immigration officials—receive the most limited judicial attention as a result of doctrines
that preclude the acquisition or consideration of the most probative forms of evidence. It
is true that racial gerrymanders receive more capacious attention and “holistic
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analysis,”282 but challenges to the use of race in redistricting are ambiguous in their
distributive effect. Like challenges to affirmative action, they can be deployed as means
to amplify as well limit minority voting power. As a result, the evidentiary framework for
taking stock of constitutional discriminatory intent tilts against the minority groups and in
favor of racial and religious majorities. Rather than being countermajoritarian, the
constitutional law of antidiscrimination tracks the interest of socially dominant groups
with impressive—and economically regressive—precision. It has become an instrument
of redistribution from marginalized minority groups to socially powerful majority one—a
symptom, rather than a cure for the pathologies of hierarchical exclusion that are
regrettably common in American history.
Second, the effect of this uneven distribution of judicial resources does not end
with the allocation or denial of remedies. Courts are not the only means of remedying
social wrongs, but they play a central role in the American context. In particular, the
Supreme Court has come to play a dominant role in national life. It enjoys a deep
reservoir of sociological legitimacy among the American public.283 The Court’s rulings
on constitutional matters—and by implication the Court’s implicit judgments about what
matters and what does not matter for constitutional compliance—therefore likely shape,
at least to some extent, the public’s understanding of the normatively freighted question
of whether the Constitution is being followed or violated.284
By selectively shining its spotlight on the existence of discrimination in some
domains and not others, the Court helps define what might be called our common
constitutional landscape, or the shared mental landscape of constitutional rights and
wrongs that characterize the polity at a given moment. Uneven allocation of judicial
search expenditures makes some kinds of wrongs more salient, and hence more plausible
problems for political redress, than others, even if their salience is not supportable on
more empirically robust grounds. What follows has been usefully labeled “hermeneutical
injustice,” the philosopher Miranda Fricker. This is a phenomenon in which “some
significant area of one’s social experience [is] obscured from collective understanding
owing to persistent and wide-ranging hermeneutical marginalization.”285 The doctrine for
282

Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 800 (2017).
See, e.g., Jeffery J. Mondak & Shannon I. Smithey, Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme Court,
57 J. POL. 1114, 1124-25 (1997) (“Public support for the Supreme Court tends to be both high and stable aggregate traits that seemingly reveal an institution largely insulated from short-term shift in public
preferences.”); Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme
Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 637 (1992) (documenting Court’s deep reservoir of public legitimacy).
284
For evidence of this effect in Establishment Clause cases, see Valerie J. Hoekstra & Jeffrey A. Segal,
The Shepherding of Local Public Opinion: The Supreme Court and Lamb’s Chapel, 58 J. POL. 1079, 1079,
1096−97 (1996); Michael A. Unger, After the Supreme Word: The Effect of McCreary County v. ACLU
(2005) and Van Orden v. Perry (2005) on Support for Public Displays of the Ten Commandments, 36 AM.
POL. RES. (2008). On gay rights, see James W. Stoutenborough, Donald P. Haider-Markel & Mahalley D.
Allen, Reassessing the Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on Public Opinion: Gay Civil Rights Cases, 59
POL. RES. Q. 419, 430 (2006) (“Supreme Court opinions can have a significant impact on public opinion in
the area of gay civil rights”). For skepticism of this effect, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 424 (2004) (focusing on
the school desegregation cases).
285
MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER & THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 154-55 (2007). A
paradigmatic example is the failure to recognize sexual harassment until the 1970s. Id. at 149-50.
283

57

discovering discriminatory intent, in short, does not merely fail to redress extant wrongs.
It also perpetrates an independent moral harm by reinforcing the nonrecognition of the
wide range of discriminatory harms that fall predictably on racial and religious
minorities.286 In this fashion, our constitutional doctrine of antidiscrimination is likely to
“induce indifference, fatalism, and passive injustice.”287
One implication of an emphasis upon the hermeneutical quality of the Court’s
interventions in social life is the mechanisms whereby different interest groups can
mobilize in federal court have meaningful distributive consequences. By allocating
among different factions different shares of the scare resource of litigation as a prism for
the focusing of public attention, the law of Article III standing and the various devices for
the collective resolution of legal questions in federal court ought to be understood as
allocative instruments—determining who can speak in which (for better or worse) has
become the distinctive American platform for rendering legible the moral wrongs of
society.288
B

Reconstructing the Judicial Toolbox in Discriminatory Intent Cases

Current asymmetries in doctrinal allocations need not, however, be maintained. It
is possible to imagine an alternative doctrinal regime that furnishes as a more level
playing field than current arrangements. The key to this is implicit in Part III’s argument:
To begin with, it requires principled and consistent explanations for the choice among
possible conceptions of discrimination. There are necessarily multiple ways in which race
can figure in government decision-making, but the Court should acknowledge this
diversity and its implications more frankly. Most importantly, diverse forms of
impermissible intent will be amenable to different kinds of evidentiary approaches.
Current law, with its lacunae and limitations on evidence acquisition, implicitly favors
some conceptions of unconstitutional intent over others. A better approach would involve
a frank recognition of the compelling need for a deep and diverse evidentiary tool-kit in
dealing with unconstitutional discrimination. It would also entail the abolition of the
existing bespoke exceptions, based on deference, hostility to statistics, or a blinkered
conception of the relevant transactional frame. All relevant evidence should always be
acquired and considered in searching for discriminatory intent. Categorical exclusions
and caveats should be uniformly abandoned—including judicial resistance to evidence of
unconscious bias and culpable failures to account for structural discrimination.
This approach is warranted on more pragmatic grounds too. A constitutional rule
concerning the permissible species of official intent must of necessity cover a wide range
of institutional and policy contexts. In this regard, it is dissimilar from elements of the
Bill of Rights that speak to the discrete and relatively isolate phenomenon of the criminal
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trial.289 An intent-based regime under either the Equal Protection Clause or the Religion
Clauses must be flexible enough to apply to collective bodies of legislators, citizens
engaged in law-making through initiatives or referenda, apex officials (such as governors
and presidents) charged with the formulation of general policy, and line-level officials
(such as police officers and field office personnel) responsible for the front-line
interactions between the state and members of the polity. Moreover, the Constitution’s
protection of vulnerable minorities extends across different policy domains. Most
importantly, it applies to both coercive and noncoercive policy choices.
This institutional and policy variety means that there will inevitably be
heterogeneity of institutional form so far as constitutional antidiscrimination rules are
concerned. Each distinct institutional actor has its own processes for deliberating on facts
and law, and its own devices for intervening in the world. It is not plausible to think that
the same version of discriminatory intent, and the same instruments for isolating such
intent, will be relevant in the thick of street policing, the struggle of legislators to carve
up new districts, and efforts of administrators and teachers to allocate educational
resources fairly and efficiently. Given this variety, it is not sensible to constrain
artificially the choice of evidentiary instruments. Rather, the full toolkit for discovering
discriminatory intent recognized in Arlington Heights should avail with no categorical
exclusions or presumptions of disfavor.
There is, nevertheless, one arguable exception to this logic in relation to the
judicial review of legislative action. The latter often reflect voters’ preferences. It is
extremely hard, however, to connect voters’ preferences on a specific policy to their
action in the voting booth, and then to the behavior of elected actors. Polling data can be
decomposed to generate analyses of the demographic profile of a majority coalition.290
But even sophisticated analysis will not, except in the most unusual cases of single-issue
campaigns, isolate public sentiments on specific issues. Moreover, people in fact rely on
their religious convictions when voting. Accounting for these preferences in a
constitutional calculus might constrict legitimate political deliberation in untenable
ways.291 Accordingly, certain kinds of intent evidence must be handled with care when it
comes to legislative decisions.292
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Evidence of popular sentiment to understand the purpose of legislative, in short,
presents unique problems. But this exclusion may well not be problematic. In contrast to
most administrative actions or exercises of executive discretion, legislators’ actions tend
to be relatively public and high visibility. Well-developed arrangements for lobbying and
influencing legislators also already exist. It might hence be thought that legislation (as
opposed to executive actors, especially when dispersed and relatively unsupervised)
required the least constitutional supervision. As a result, exclusion of one source from
which to infer the motive behind legislation is not problematic.
Otherwise, however, the time is ripe to return to a more even-handed and catholic
evidentiary apparatus in grappling with the many varieties of discriminatory intent barred
under the Equal Protection and Religion Clauses.
Conclusion
The granular ways in which grand, abstract ideas such as ‘discriminatory intent’
are implemented turns out to be highly consequential to the practical meaning of
constitutional guarantees. My aim in this Article has been to tease out the clashing and
contesting ideas that lie behind that seemingly unitary concept of discriminatory intent.
Such diversity might well be beneficial, if it works to capture the various ways in which
impermissible classifications find their way into government decision-making. Yet care
must be taken to avoid an evidentiary apparatus that skews the allocation of judicial
resources away from some deserving litigants to others. Achieving that level playing field
requires no dramatic doctrinal fix—but rather a return to the appropriately capacious and
flexible way in which the Court initially proposed to discover unconstitutional,
discriminatory intent when that notion first seized hold of the Justices’ imagination. It is,
therefore, a rare instance in which a return to first principles can be justified by appeal to
forward-looking considerations.
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